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INTRODUCTION
The liability reform debates of the last twenty years have
prompted academics, policymakers, and legislatures to devote in-
creased attention to the theory and workings of the massive liability
insurance structure in America. These efforts have taught us much
about important topics, including the demand for liability insurance;1
the relationship of liability insurance to the goals of corrective justice
and efficiency;2 the relative merits of first-party versus third-party in-
surance in achieving efficient levels of deterrence and loss-spreading;3
1. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and Egg, Destructive
Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1994) (urging "closer examination
of the costs and benefits of the underlying tort rules and processes whose results are in-
sured"); Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insur-
ance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1681 (1994) (arguing that liability
insurance supply and demand is driven by the legal liability imposed for accidental loss
and injury to third parties); Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX.
L. REv. 1629, 1632 (1994) (arguing that "insurers and attorneys ... have successfully...
driven us to overconsume liability insurance"). For the impact of tort reform on liability
insurance costs, see generally Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform
Legislation: Assessing Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLC INTEREST 272, 273(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (appraising the success of tort reform in reducing insurer
losses and insurance premiums); W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance in the Wake of Liability Reform, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 463 (1995) (examining the effect
of liability reforms on medical insurance from 1984-91).
2. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs OF ACCIDENT LAw 186-261 (1987) (discuss-
ing the relationship of liability insurance to the efficiency aims of tort law); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 365
(1990) (examining the relationship of liability insurance to the goals of tort law).
3. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance
Markets, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 518-19 (1984) (discussing both an "efficient liability rule"
that achieves, among other things, "risk bearing," and the "reduced incentives for injury
prevention" posed by a "rule of third-party liability"); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
First-Party Insurance Externality: An EconomicJustification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 136-37 (1990) (arguing that first-party insurance leads to externalizing accident
costs to the insurers, thereby affecting the efficiency of products liability law); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1590 (1987)
(arguing that tort law reform requires a "redefinition of liability standards to better achieve
accident reduction and insurance"); Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and
the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 94-
95 (1993) (arguing that the insurance theory of compensation-that individuals' insur-
ance choices should determine appropriate compensation payments-is a flawed answer to
the question of how tort law should compensate for nonpecuniary harms).
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the role of the insurer's duty to settle in modern tort litigation;4 the
limits of the insurance mechanism with respect to environmental in-
jury;5 the workings of the liability insurance regime in the medical
malpractice context;' and how the law of "bad faith" affects claims
processing and tort claim management.7
Of the items left on the research agenda, one of the most impor-
tant is the "defense insurance" that most Americans have in some
form or another.' Virtually all standard personal and commercial lia-
4. See Seth J. Chandler, Reconsidering the Duty to Settle, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 744 (1993)
(analyzing the economic effects of the insurer's duty to settle); Charles Silver, A Missed
Misalignment of Interests: A Comment On Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585,
1596 (1991) (commenting on Professor Syverud's views regarding insurers' incentives to
reject settlement offers); Alan 0. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insur-
ers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1345, 1348 (1994) (questioning
the rationale for extracontractual liability for failure to settle); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to
Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1208 (1990) (examining the duty to settle and the relationship
of tort litigation to liability insurance).
5. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 944 (1988) (tracing the demise of the environmental liability insur-
ance market to the uncertainty caused by new environmental liability).
6. The literature relating to liability insurance in the medical malpractice arena is
extensive. See PATRIcIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
PoLIcY 226 (1985) (proposing tort law reforms to make the malpractice system "more cost-
effective for purposes of both deterrence and compensation"); FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL.,
INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 15 (1991) (describing the workings of medical malpractice
insurance to provide an empirical basis for policy proposals); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE AND THE AMERICANJURY 265 (1997) (dispelling the view that malpractice juries are
incompetent and prejudiced on the basis of empirical evidence); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 160 (1991) (arguing that addressing the critical financial needs of
the patient furthers the compensation and prevention goals of malpractice law); Viscusi &
Born, supra note 1, at 463 (using data from firms writing medical malpractice insurance
from 1984 to 1991 to gauge the effect of liability reforms on profitability).
7. See generally Ellen Smith Pryor & Charles Silver, Introduction to Symposium on the Law
of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1203, 1203-05 (1994) (discussing the
status of bad faith law and introducing collected scholarship on contract and insurance
issues).
8. In recent years, the scholarly literature has begun to address defense insurance in
more detail. See Stephen S. Ashley, Extrinsic Facts and the Duty to Defend, 9 BAD FAITH L. REP.
197, 201 (1993) (examining California decisions and arguing that it is unsound to hold
that an insurer has a duty to defend if facts having no bearing on the insured's liability
ultimately establish that the policy provides no coverage); William T. Barker, Dissident
Thoughts on the Duty of Defense, 9 BAD FAITH L. REP. 115, 115-16 (1993) [hereinafter Barker,
Dissident Thoughts] (arguing that the insurer's status as a co-client of the insured's counsel,
and the insurer's contractual right to select counsel and control the defense, should
render it vicariously liable for the defense counsel's blunders); William T. Barker, When
Does the Insurer Lose the Right to Control the Defense?, 58 DEF. COUNS.J. 469, 481 (1991) [here-
inafter Barker, When Does the Insurer Lose] (analyzing the insurer's control of the defense in
a case of conflict of interest); James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to Defend: How
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 141, 146-49 (1991) (explaining the origin of the insurer's duty to defend);
Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer's Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. LJ. 221, 222 (1997) (ar-
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bility policies-including auto, homeowners', and commercial gen-
eral liability-give the insurer both the right and the duty to defend
any lawsuit that seeks damages covered under the insured's policy, no
matter how groundless the suit may be.9 With our liability insurance
premiums, then, we purchase two connected but distinct protections:
a promise to pay on our behalf-up to the policy limits-if we are
found liable ("indemnity insurance"),' 0 and a promise to provide a
defense regardless of how justified the lawsuit is, and regardless of
how much that defense costs ("defense insurance")." Usually, the
promise to defend is not directly capped by the policy limits; for exam-
ple, the insurer on a $50,000 liability policy must provide a defense,
whether the defense costs five thousand dollars, one hundred thou-
sand dollars, or more. In addition, the defense obligation often exists
even when it is doubtful that the insurer will owe a duty to pay for the
injury that is the subject of the lawsuit.' 2
The contours of defense insurance have key implications for the
tort system. First, whether and on what terms potential defendants
can obtain insurance against defense costs are issues that bear on the
guing that "a liability insurer's duty to defend arises only if the policy covers the conduct at
issue in the litigation against the insured"); Alan I. Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of
Liability Insurers to Defend their Insureds: The Case for Separating the Obligation to Indemnify from
the Defense of Insureds, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 917, 919 (1990) (arguing that the obligation to
indemnify should be separated from the duty to defend in insurance agreements). Practi-
cal commentators and continuing legal education programs in recent years have addressed
both the duty to defend and the collateral disputes that arise as a result of the duty. See,
e.g., LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAIM: DENIAL OF COVERAGE & DuTY TO DEFEND (A.B.A.,
Tort & Insurance Practice Section, 1992) (presenting papers addressing the practical issues
facing litigators in disputes about insurance coverage); Robert R. Reeder, The Duty to De-
fend, Address at Insurance: Third Party Liability Seminar sponsored by The Defense Re-
search Institute, Inc. (Mar. 11-12, 1993) (addressing the scope and the parameters of the
duty to defend).
9. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, POLICY KIT FOR INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS 198,
201 (1993-94) (reprinting a standard commercial general liability policy formulated by the
Insurance Services Office and providing that "[w]e will have the right and duty to defend
any 'suit' seeking those damages"); id. at 29 (reprinting a standard homeowners' policy
providing that "we will [p1rovide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice").
10. See id. at 201 (reprinting a standard commercial general liability policy providing
that "[w] e will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of 'personal injury' or 'advertising injury' to which this coverage part applies").
According to policy language, only settlements approved by the insurer constitute covered
liabilities. Id. at 206 (providing that the insurer may be sued to recover the amount of an
agreed judgment, but defining "agreed judgment" as "a settlement and release of liability
signed by us, the insured and the claimant or the claimant's legal representative").
11. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92 (describing the basic rules about the duty
to defend).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
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justice and efficiency goals of the tort system. 13 Second, under most
insurance arrangements, the insurer's obligation to defend is not en-
tirely distinct from its obligation to pay the ultimate tort judgment or
settlement. Instead, in complex and often misunderstood ways, the
defense question-"Must the insurer provide a defense in this
case?"-very much affects another question-"Will the injured tort
plaintiff receive any compensation in this case?" 4 To some degree,
moreover, the strategic behavior of the parties to the tort litigation
influences the link between defense insurance and compensation for
injury.1" Thus, the structure of the defense obligation implicates is-
sues of compensation, systematically affects the litigation strategies
and settlement choices of parties to tort litigation, and bears on the
efficiency of the tort system. Third, the insurer's obligation to defend
creates a host of thorny professional responsibility issues for the insur-
ance defense counsel,16 and gives rise to much ancillary litigation re-
lating to professional responsibility, the insurer's negligence or bad
faith in not defending, and the manner in which the insurer con-
ducted the defense. 17
A careful look at the defense obligation and its connection to the
tort litigation system is especially timely because the nature and scope
of the obligation have become increasingly contested terrain in recent
years.' 8 Several factors have contributed to this change. First, the
scope, length, and expense of much modern tort litigation have raised
13. Cf Schwartz, supra note 2, at 325 (explaining that liability insurance promotes fair-
ness by allowing insureds to protect themselves against the unreliability of the civil justice
system).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79 (explaining how the duty to defend affects
the likelihood and amount of compensation to the plaintiff.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 154-158, 161-164.
16. For a recent entry in the extensive scholarship on these issues, see Charles Silver &
Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255,
263 (1995) (exploring the nature of the relationship between insurance defense counsel,
the insurer, and the insured). See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAw § 7.6, at 809-10 (1988) (identifying conflicts of interest concerning, for example, the
insurer's requirements, insured's requests, and the roles, rights, and responsibilities of the
insurer and the insured); Symposium, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional Responsibil-
ity, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
17. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw §§ 111 [g], 111 [h], 114 (2d
ed. 1996) (discussing, respectively, insurer's liability for inadequate defense, remedies for
breach of duty to defend, and conflicts of interest in insurance defense representations);
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L.
REv. 1295, 1295-96 (1994) (analyzing the history of the growth of bad faith liability claims
against insurers since the 1970s).
18. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 111[e], at 750 (observing that the nature and scope of
the duty to defend remain controversial for courts).
1999]
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the stakes for defense insurance.' 9 Measures of defense costs over the
past fifteen years have indicated that an increasing percentage of total
liability insurance payments-as much as forty-one percent-is attrib-
utable to defense costs."z These increased costs, in turn, affect the
number of disputes over the defense obligation. Because insurers are
not obligated to defend every lawsuit, but only a lawsuit laying out a
potentially covered theory of liability, 1 insurers have always decided
not to defend some lawsuits.2 2 But the spectre of massively expensive
litigation plays a part in the calculation. When the costs of defense
are relatively small, an insurer that doubts its duty to defend nonethe-
less might find it cost-efficient to fund the defense. Yet, harboring no
greater a doubt, but facing litigation far more costly, an insurer might
decide that denying a defense is the most cost-efficient option.
Second, plaintiffs' lawyers have discovered that defense insurance
can be their ally, not their enemy. The point might seem counterin-
tuitive. One would suppose that plaintiffs' lawyers are happy to see
potential funding for a tort judgment, but are less pleased that the
insurer is the opponent, in light of the latter's resources and abilities
as a repeat litigator. Yet the duty to defend is often a doorway into
some payment for the tort victim. This doorway was never a secret
one, but in recent years it has widened and become more visible.
Plaintiffs' lawyers often plead lawsuits in a way designed to trigger a
duty to defend even when there is quite likely no ultimate indemnity
coverage.23 The hope is that, either by misstepping or consciously de-
ciding to settle, the insurer will cover at least part of the tort liability.
19. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., LEGAL DEFENSE: A LARGE AND STILL GROWING
INSURANCE COST 4 (1991) (reporting that, in 1991, defense costs for the casualty lines of
insurance amounted to $15 billion or 14% of the total insured losses for those lines of
insurance). Insurers have responded to rising costs with a number of cost-control devices,
including outside auditing of legal bills, flat-fee or bundled-fee arrangements, and the use
of "staff counsel" operations to defend suits. See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys:
Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers,
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 256 (1997) (defending the use of flat fees and staff counsel as neces-
sary to the freedom of clients and lawyers to enter into consensual relationships). In the
mid-1980s, the Insurance Services Office, a trade organization that prepares policy forms
and helps obtain regulatory approval, sought to modify the standard commercial general
liability policy so that defense costs would be included within the limits of the policy. See
KathrynJ. McIntyre, ISO Head Urges Including Defense Costs in Policy Limits, Bus. INS., May 20,
1985, at 1. Eventually, the effort was dropped, partly in the face of regulatory doubts about
the proposal. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § l111U], at 762.
20. JERRY, supra note 17, § 111U], at 762 n.143.
21. Id. § 111[a], at 729.
22. Id.
23. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance
Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1729-35 (1997) (explaining why plaintiffs' lawyers have rea-
son to underlitigate intentional harm cases as involving only negligence).
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This Article focuses on several core questions about the structure
of the defense obligation. As suggested by cryptic policy language and
as currently interpreted by the courts, the defense obligation often
exists even when there is doubt that the policy provides indemnity
coverage for the injury that forms the basis of the lawsuit against the
insured. The insurer must defend the suit if the plaintiff alleges a
claim that might be covered, even if facts suggest that the claim is not
covered.2 4 No other form of insurance has this structure. Why does
this asymmetry between defense insurance and indemnity insurance
exist? Is it efficient in terms of deterrence and loss-spreading, and, if
not, why has the marketplace not responded? Even if this asymmetry
is efficient in theory, is the defense obligation implemented in a way
that is consistent with the fairness and efficiency objectives of the tort
insurance regime? An answer to this latter question, in turn, requires
addressing several doctrinal questions. When is the insurer obligated
to defend if coverage for the underlying harm is doubtful? May the
insurer escape the defense obligation once it has assumed it? Should
courts allow simultaneous litigation in separate courts of the defense
obligation and the tort suit?
How these questions are answered has a direct bearing on the
effects noted earlier-the justice and efficiency of defense insurance,
the extent to which defense insurance becomes translated into pay-
ment to the tort victim, and the extent and nature of ancillary litiga-
tion relating to professional responsibility and the insurer's
obligations. Neither the marketplace nor the body of insurance doc-
trine currently provides satisfying answers to these questions. For rea-
sons discussed below, insurance contracts do not answer these
questions, and the marketplace has not responded with policy modifi-
cations that settle these issues.25 Judicially created standards address
the defense obligation in great detail, but in many jurisdictions the
resulting doctrines remain unclear, unstable, or unsatisfying.2 6
Part I examines the theoretical structure of defense insurance. It
explains why and on what terms insurers and insureds, respectively,
are willing to sell and buy it; why it is so commonly bundled with in-
demnity insurance; and why the coverage scope of defense insurance,
24. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (discussing current tests for deciding if
the insurer owes a duty to defend).
25. See infta text accompanying notes 43-49.
26. See infra notes 90-92 (identifying jurisdictions in which simultaneous adjudication




although not identical to that of indemnity insurance, is closely simi-
lar to it.
Part II more closely examines the decisional structure of defense
insurance. It addresses why courts universally view this insurance as
having a different decisional structure than other forms of first-party
insurance.27 Two features mark this structure. First, at least at the
outset of a lawsuit against the insured, the defense obligation, unlike
other insurance, turns not on the actual facts relating to coverage, but
on what the tort plaintiff alleges in the lawsuit against the insured-
the so-called complaint allegation rule.2" Second, courts often will
not allow a declaratory judgment proceeding that seeks to adjudicate
the defense obligation while the underlying suit against the insured is
still pending.29 Thus, an insurer that contests its duty to defend often
cannot litigate this issue in a declaratory judgment, but instead must
continue to provide a defense according to the complaint allegation
rule.
Although most courts agree with these two features, important
jurisdictional differences remain. 30 Some jurisdictions remain unset-
tled about the appropriate standards. Not until 1993, for instance,
did the California Supreme Court, in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court,31 resolve extensive and conflicting previous authority relat-
ing to the decisional structure of the duty to defend. A number of
other jurisdictions have not yet settled on stable rules in this area.32
27. First-party insurance refers to insurance arrangements under which the insurer
pays the proceeds, if due, to the insured or the insured's designated beneficiary. Third-
party insurance refers to arrangements under which the insurer pays someone injured by
the insured's conduct. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISyL INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 175 (1986) (discussing this distinction in the context of legal
regulation of the claims process). Thus, although defense insurance is bundled within a
policy of liability insurance, it is first-party insurance.
28. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing the complaint allegation
rule).
29. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the range of judicial ap-
proaches to declaratory judgment actions involving overlapping facts); infra notes 177-181
(discussing the range of judicial approaches to declaratory judgment actions involving
nonoverlapping facts).
30. See infta notes 90-92 and accompanying text; infra notes 177-181.
31. 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993) (in bank). See generally Paula L. Harrington, Note, The
Duty to Defend in California After Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court: Is the Califor-
nia Supreme Court Protecting Policyholders or Encouraging Litigation and the Early Settlement of
Unworthy Claims?, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 165, 165-67 (1994) (examining the implications of the
Montrose decision for policyholders).
32. See infta text accompanying notes 90-92 (discussing various jurisdictional ap-
proaches to the duty to defend in overlapping cases); text accompanying notes 177-181
(discussing various jurisdictional approaches to the duty to defend in nonoverlapping
cases).
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Thus, both features of the decisional structure should be ex-
amined in light of the systemic aims of insurance and tort law. To do
so, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of cases: cases in
which the insurer's coverage argument does not overlap with the is-
sues at stake in the underlying tort suit, and cases in which such an
overlap exists. Turning first to overlapping scenarios, Part II argues
that the insurer's obligation in such cases should have a different deci-
sional structure than other forms of insurance. The complaint allega-
tion rule ought to govern, and the insurer generally should not be
allowed to contest its defense obligation on the basis of the actual facts
in a declaratory judgment suit.
Part III turns to the nonoverlapping scenario, and argues that in
these cases the defense obligation should be given the same decisional
structure as other forms of first-party insurance. Thus, an insurer
should not be required to follow the complaint allegation rule, and
generally should be permitted to pursue a declaratory judgment ac-
tion using the actual facts relating to coverage.
I. THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF DEFENSE INSURANCE
The most interesting and complex issues posed by the defense
obligation-including the effects it has on the strategies of the parties
to tort litigation-arise because defense insurance may be available in
a given case even when indemnity insurance is not.A To address
these issues, we need to understand the relationship between defense
insurance and indemnity insurance. Why is defense insurance bought
and sold? To what extent do efficiency and fairness considerations
require that the scope of defense insurance be linked to the scope of
indemnity insurance? This Part addresses these questions. This will
allow a discussion, in Parts II and III, of the proper decisional struc-
ture for the duty to defend.
A. Why Litigation Insurance Is Bought and Sold
In explaining the demand for litigation insurance, the starting
point is the value of a defense.3 4 Defendants spend money on a de-
fense because the provision of a better or worse defense can affect a
case's outcome. Because a defense is valuable, a rational individual or
corporation would anticipate having to pay for a defense in the event
33. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 111 [a], at 730 (explaining that the duty to indemnify is
much narrower than the duty to defend, because the latter includes even meritless suits
that on their face are covered by the policy).




of suit. Thus, an individual or corporation can anticipate that a law-
suit will impose two potential losses: the judgment amount (if any)
that the individual will have to pay; and the costs of defending the
suit.
Defense costs, then, are simply another type of loss to which the
insured might be exposed. Importantly, this loss, like the cost of lia-
bility for the underlying harm itself, is uncertain in frequency and
magnitude. The costs of defense might be relatively small in a given
case, or might be enormous. Standard economic analysis teaches that
individuals are generally risk averse; that is, they care not just about
the expected value of a loss, but also about the magnitude of the loss
in relation to their wealth. 5 For instance, an individual will prefer a
certain loss of $2000 over a ten percent chance of losing $20,000,
notwithstanding that both scenarios have the same expected value.
Thus, an individual will be willing to incur the cost of insurance pre-
miums in exchange for a guarantee that, should the insured loss arise,
she will be protected from that loss.3 6
The analysis of corporate demand for insurance is more complex.
Defense insurance is a component of the commercial general insur-
ance policy purchased by many small and large American firms, as
well as a number of other standard commercial line policies, such as
35. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 11-12 (discussing basic incentives to purchase insur-
ance); SFIAVELL, supra note 2, at 186-93 (explaining why individuals and firms will wish to
purchase insurance to cover future losses whose magnitude is uncertain); Georges Dionne
& Scott E. Harrington, An Introduction to Insurance Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE
ECONOMICS 1, 3-6 (Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1992) (discussing expected
utility as a tool in insurance analysis). While the expected utility framework remains an
essential tool in understanding insurance relationships, considerable literature now dem-
onstrates that individual choices about risks and uncertainties deviate from the rational
choice model as a result of biases, the framing of choices, and other factors. See Colin
Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Making Decisions About Liability and Insurance: Editors' Com-
ments, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 7-8 (1993); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability
Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48-49 (1993); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (setting
forth the heuristic principles on which people rely to assess the probability of uncertain
events).
36. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 11-12 (discussing insurance law and economic effi-
ciency); SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 187-93 (analyzing risk aversion and the allocation of
risk). Under the standard economic account, risk aversion is the consequence of the di-
minishing marginal utility of income: "It should seem plausible that a party for whom
[increased wealth has diminished marginal utility] will especially dislike bearing the risk of
large losses, for such losses will evidently matter to him disproportionately in terms of
utility." Id. at 187. The risk aversion that motivates the purchase of liability insurance also
is likely to flow from psychological considerations. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 322 & n.39
(discussing, in light of psychological studies, how insurance converts possible losses into
more psychologically acceptable events).
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boiler, machinery, and commercial auto.17 To some extent, corporate
purchases of insurance can be explained by aversion on the part of
managers, or employees whose jobs are linked to the company's per-
formance, to the possibility of enormous defense bills."8
Insurers are willing to sell defense insurance for two reasons.
The first follows from standard insurance analysis. Given sufficient
numbers of similar, uncorrelated, and otherwise insurable risks, an
insurer can take advantage of the law of large numbers to predict the
aggregate risk and calculate premiums on that basis.3 9 This analysis
also applies to the risk that an insured will be sued and that litigation
costs will be incurred.
A second reason concerns the indemnity portion of the liability
insurance contract. Because insurers promise to pay any damages (up
to the policy limit) for which the insured might be legally liable, the
insurer has a powerful incentive to control the defense of the law-
suit.4 ° Were the insurer to abstain from any role in the defense, then
the insured would be free to settle or defend the case as she saw fit.
Even if the insurance contract or a court required the insured to act
"reasonably" in this respect, the insurer might fear that this standard
would not give an adequate incentive to the insured to engage in a
vigorous defense, settle for a reasonable amount, or keep the defense
tab within acceptable limits.41 Insureds also benefit from the insurer's
37. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 9, at 198 (reprinting commercial
general liability policy with duty to defend); id. at 150 (reprinting boiler and machinery
policy with duty to defend); id, at 223 (reprinting business auto insurance policy contain-
ing duty to defend).
38. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 189-90 (discussing the importance of risk aversion with
regard to individuals and firms). Other factors include the loss prevention and reduction
services that insurers provide, and the fact that corporations might be required to show
proof of insurance coverage as a condition to certain business transactions. See Pottier &
Witt, supra note 1, at 1684. For further discussion of corporate demand for insurance, see
David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demandfor Insurance, 55J. Bus. 281,
281-82 (1982) (arguing that the corporate demand for insurance is not adequately ex-
plained as risk aversion, but as part of the firm's financing policy with respect to taxes,
contracting costs, or the impact of financing policy on the firm's investment decisions).
39. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 24-26 (4th
ed. 1992) (explaining the need for large numbers of insureds in the calculation of insura-
ble risk); Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 1656 (discussing the relationship of risk, risk aversion,
and liability insurance); Patricia M. Danzon & Scott E. Harrington, The Demand for and
Supply of Liability Insurance, in CONTRIBuTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 25, 26 (Georges
Dionne ed., 1992) (discussing the literature on the supply and demand for liability insur-
ance with attention to the relationship between liability law, liability insurance, and risk
reduction).
40. JERRY, supra note 17, § llI[a], at 731.
41. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?,
72 TEX. L. RE,. 1583, 1595-96 (1994) (suggesting reasons why the insurer will want the
right to defend and will demand exclusive control of the defense).
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expertise in managing litigation, including the selection of competent
counsel, monitoring of counsel, and skill in bargaining and trial
strategy.
4 2
This second reason helps explain several features of the current
defense insurance marketplace. First, indemnity and defense insur-
ance are bundled together in standard policy lines. In theory, in-
sureds could purchase defense insurance from one insurer and
indemnity coverage from another. Indeed, this would help reduce
many problems generated by bundling the two together, particularly
conflicts of interest for insurance defense counsel.4" Yet the market-
place has not responded by adopting or pushing for an unbundled
approach.44 In the mid-1980s, insurers sought regulatory approval of
policies that would apply a single policy limit to both the costs of in-
demnity and the costs of defense.45 But these efforts stalled, in part as
a result of regulatory objections.46 By contrast, insurers apparently
have not even sought regulatory approval in any widespread manner
for unbundled indemnity and defense insurance in standard policy
lines. The lack of a marketplace response to this obvious alternative is
a powerful testament to the mutual advantages of linking insurer con-
trol over the defense with the insurer's indemnity obligation.
These same considerations help explain a second salient feature
of the current defense insurance marketplace. Although the duty to
defend is bundled with indemnity insurance in standard individual
policies and in the commercial general liability policy purchased by
thousands of American firms, this is not a universal feature of corpo-
42. See William T. Barker, Insurance Defense Ethics and the Liability Insurance Bargain, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 79 (1998) (noting that, because insurers are in the business of manag-
ing litigation, they must be efficient and minimize costs or risk losses); Silver, supra note
41, at 1596.
43. For an argument advocating complete separation of defense insurance from in-
demnity insurance, see Widiss, supra note 8, at 945.
44. Apparently, some individuals within the insurance industry began in the early to
mid-1980s to seek limits on defense costs or elimination of the defense obligation from
standard policies, but this was met with objections from risk managers, agents, and brokers.
Telephone Interview with Sean Mooney, Actuary at Insurance Services Office (Sept. 22,
1995). See also Richard S.L. Roddis, Control of Legal Expenses-The Greatest Current Challenge,
Address Before the National Association of Independent Insurance Adjusters 13-14 (May 1,
1986) (arguing for redrafting of standard commercial general liability policies to eliminate
the insurer's duty to defend while still reserving its right to defend).
45. See McIntyre, supra note 19, at 1, 34 (discussing efforts by Insurance Services Office
to draft and obtain regulatory approval of commercial general liability forms that include
defense costs within the indemnity limits of the policy); see also JERRY, supra note 17,
§ I Ij], at 762 (discussing these efforts).
46. See Shaun M. Baldwin, Legal and Ethical Considerations for "Defense Within Limits"Poli-
cies, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 89, 89-90 (1994) (describing insurance regulators' opposition to
"defense within limits" policies).
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rate insurance. Many corporations carry a large deductible or self-
insured retention, and purchase insurance only for exposure in excess
of the deductible or self-insured retention.47 Such policies often pro-
vide that the insurer has no duty to defend the claim, although the
policies may give the insurer certain rights to participate in or approve
of defense or settlement decisions.4" These arrangements are under-
standable in light of the considerations just noted. These insured en-
tities, unlike small firms or individuals, are often repeat litigators with
in-house legal staff that can effectively manage and monitor litigation.
In addition, the insured's retention of a considerable level of liability
exposure helps protect the insurer from the risk that the insured will
fail to defend the case vigorously or will settle the case for an unrea-
sonable sum.4"
These points help explain why defense insurance is so commonly
sold and purchased, and why it is ordinarily bundled with indemnity
insurance. But what is the optimal link between indemnity and de-
fense coverage, and do policies in practice contain this type of link?
The next subpart takes up these questions.
47. For discussion of excess insurance over self-insured retentions, as well as other in-
surance arrangements that allocate risk differently than standard policies, see William T.
Barker, Combining Insurance and Self Insurance: Issues for Handling Claims, 61 DEF. COUNS. J.
352, 352-55 (1994); Syverud, supra note 4, at 1201-07.
Certain policies, such as those covering directors' and officers' liability, do not contain
separate defense insurance uncapped by policy limits. Instead, under these policies the
total policy limits apply to both indemnity costs and defense costs, and the insured pro-
vides its own defense. See ALLUANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERs, supra note 9, at 420-23 (re-
printing directors' and officers' liability policy in which "loss" is defined to include
indemnity payouts and defense costs, and under which the insurer has no duty to defend
the insured).
48. Such policies are not highly standardized. See, e.g., North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The insured had a deducti-
ble of $1 million, and policies covering, respectively, exposure from $1 to $5 million, and
$5 to $20 million; the policy for the first excess layer provided that "[t]he [Insurer] shall
not be called upon to assume charge of the defense or settlement of any claims made or
suits brought or proceedings instituted against the Insured." Id. at 1329. But the policy
also provided that the insurer "shall have the right and shall be given the opportunity to
associate with the Insured in the defense and control of any claim," and shall have "the
right to assume complete control of any claim," if the claim appears to implicate the in-
surer's limit of liability under the policy. Id
49. This is not to say that the arrangement aligns perfectly the interests of insureds and
insurers. Particularly in recent years, disputes between insureds and excess insurers have
ripened into litigation over issues relating to control and management of litigation and
reasonable settlement conduct. See, e.g., id. at 1325.
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B. The Content of Litigation Insurance: Theory and Practice
To sketch the optimal structure of litigation insurance, it is help-
ful first to address the scope of the indemnity coverage on which ra-
tional parties would agree. Generally, a risk-averse insured would seek
to purchase indemnity insurance that includes all the categories of
conduct that might expose the insured to the risk of liability.50 If the
insured faces a risk of liability for polluting the environment, the in-
sured will seek indemnity insurance for that risk, and likewise for
other types of liability risks that the individual faces, such as defama-
tion or negligence.
On the other hand, insureds often would agree to certain exclu-
sions in the indemnity coverage. They would agree to any exclusion
relating to an activity or risk that the insured can be confident does
not apply to her. For instance, an individual homeowner would agree
to an exclusion for any liabilities arising out of business uses of the
premises. If she knows that she does not use the premises in connec-
tion with any business, she can be fairly certain that she will never be
subject to a business-related liability for this site. Thus, she would be
willing to agree to an exclusion in exchange for the lower premium
that the insurer will charge her as a result. Some very important in-
demnity exclusions, such as those for products liability and business
risks, can be explained on this basis.51
This demand-side analysis explains some common indemnity ex-
clusions, but not all. Some indemnity exclusions stem mainly from
supply-side considerations. Insurers might decide that a risk is too dif-
ficult to predict,52 that adverse selection with respect to this risk will
be too great,53 or that the risk is too highly correlated. 54 Supply-side
50. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 193 (explaining that policies providing full coverage
against potential loss are optimal). Although full coverage appears optimal, the very fact
that an activity is covered by insurance might increase the chances that an individual will
be sued, and the purchase of higher indemnity amounts might increase the size of judg-
ments or settlements. For discussion of these possibilities, see Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at
1655-70 (questioning Syverud's thesis that insurance drives liability and increases tort
awards and settlements); Syverud, supra note 1, at 1633-49 (proposing that liability insur-
ance expands tort liability in various ways). An individual with few collectible assets, then,
might rationally choose to go without insurance, or with low limits, on the theory that this
will lessen the chances of a suit.
51. Cf Pryor, supra note 23, at 1741 (noting that an individual insured would agree to
an exclusion for products liability because he faces no risk of such liability).
52. See REJDA, supra note 39, at 25-26 (explaining that insurers must be able to calculate
risks in order to set appropriate premiums).
53. Adverse selection occurs when potential insureds know more than the insurer
about their expected insured loss, even after the insurer gains information about the in-
sured through the underwriting process. Insureds possessing this asymmetrical informa-
tion will purchase insurance that is priced on the basis of the average risk posed by a
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considerations probably explain the pollution exclusion in standard
individual and commercial lines."
Other exclusions result from a blend of demand and supply con-
siderations. This is the likely explanation for the most important stan-
dard exclusion, the exclusion for losses caused intentionally by the
insured.56 From the insurer's perspective, intentionally controlled
losses are, in the main, not actuarially predictable, and they pose
moral hazard and adverse selection problems that further undermine
their insurability. 7 From the insured's perspective, too, the purchase
of insurance for such losses might not be sensible. For most insurance
purchasers, it would be cheaper to engage in prevention activities-
that is, to avoid intentionally harmful behavior-than to purchase in-
surance for it, even if such insurance could be purchased at an actu-
arially fair price.58 In addition, although individuals rationally
purchase insurance against the possibility of erroneous liability find-
ings, insureds could plausibly decide that an erroneous jury finding of
intentional harm is less likely than an erroneous finding of
negligence.59
In sum, the insured would seek to purchase liability-indemnity
insurance against all categories of risk into which the insured's activi-
ties fall. But this is not to say that the liability-indemnity insurance will
cover every category of risk. The insured would agree to exclusions as
particular pool of insureds. The insurer, in turn, will have made this pricing decision on
the assumption that the insured pool will eventually contain some insureds who pose a
lower-than-average risk and some who pose a higher-than-average risk. Because this insur-
ance will be attractively priced to those insureds who know they are high risk, they will
enroll in higher number than the insured assumed when setting the price. See ABRAHAM,
supra note 27, at 15; Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 140 (explaining the formation of
insurance pools based on the riskiness of the insured).
54. See REJDA, supra note 39, at 25 (noting that one criterion of an insurance risk is that
a given event not cause losses simultaneously to too many insureds).
55. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 46-51 (explaining the difficulties of accurately pre-
dicting the risks related to toxic substances, and describing the problems this creates for
insurability).
56. See Pryor, supra note 23, at 1741-43 (discussing reasons why both insurers and in-
sureds would agree to exclude coverage for intentional harms).
57. See id. at 1742 (explaining that the risks from intentional acts do not conform to
the law of large numbers); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., The Economics of Insurance Law, 13 ITrr'L REV.
L. & ECoN. 145, 155-58 (1993) (commenting that insurers will not cover intentional acts
due to the moral hazard inherent in doing so).
58. See Pryor, supra note 23, at 1742 (discussing the benefit to insureds of not insuring
liability for harm produced intentionally by the insured).
59. See George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 AIA. L. REv. 1009, 1026
(1989) (noting that risks associated with intentional harms are not likely to be realized);
Pryor, supra note 23, at 1742 (suggesting that erroneous findings of intentional tort liability
might be less common than erroneous findings of negligence).
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to any risks not potentially created by the insured's activities; the in-
surer will insist on exclusions for risks that are not deemed
insurable. 60
Turning to the content of litigation insurance, one feature is ob-
vious. A potential insured seeking defense insurance would not want
this coverage to turn on whether or not the suit filed against the in-
sured has merit. For instance, while an insured employer might antic-
ipate that it will be subject to a number of meritess sexual harassment
claims, it still will desire insurance against the costs of that litigation,
regardless of its merits.
In practice, litigation insurance contains this feature. According
to the language of standard policies,61 and under insurance doctrine
that courts universally follow, an insurer is not allowed to deny a de-
fense solely because it believes that the suit against the insured lacks
merit.
6 2
The more difficult topic is whether and what sorts of exclusions
would be optimal for defense insurance. The first issue is whether the
optimal defense insurance coverage would contain any exclusions, or
would instead extend to any type of litigation filed against the defend-
ant. Some exclusions would be desirable from the insured's perspec-
tive. For instance, consider a possible exclusion for business uses of a
boat. The insured, recall, does not desire indemnity insurance for
business uses because either: (1) the insured does not expect ever
using the boat for such purposes; or (2) the insured will be covered by
her employer's own insurance if the boat is involved in an accident
while being used in connection with business.6" For these same rea-
sons, the insured will not want defense insurance to extend to situa-
tions in which the boat was being used for business purposes. She
would have to pay an added premium for coverage that she does not
anticipate needing.
Some exclusions to defense insurance, then, are optimal. But
would the exclusions in defense insurance mirror those in indemnity
insurance? For instance, if the indemnity insurance excludes business
uses, products liability, pollution, and intentional harm, would these
60. In a similar vein, an insurer might be willing to offer coverage for a certain risk, but
only at a price that is excessive relative to the actuarially fair price. The result will be a
choice by the insured not to purchase that coverage, and a resulting policy exclusion for
that coverage. See Pryor, supra note 23, at 1743 (stating that even those people at a high
risk of harm from certain risks would not be willing to pay excessively high premiums).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84 (providing examples of the relevant stan-
dard policy language).
62. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § lll[a], at 729.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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same exclusions apply to defense? Consider first the exclusions that
stem from demand-side considerations, such as business uses or prod-
ucts liability.64 For the same reasons that the insured would accept
these exclusions for indemnity insurance, the insured also would ac-
cept these exclusions for defense insurance. When the exclusion
stems mainly or partly from supply-side considerations,65 whether the
same exclusion also would apply to defense insurance depends on
whether the same supply-side difficulties extend to defense insurance.
Often, this would be the case. For instance, many of the insurability
problems associated with indemnity for pollution costs, such as ad-
verse selection and predicticability of the exposure, also apply to de-
fense costs for litigation relating to pollution.66
Generally, litigation insurance in practice tends to fit this analysis.
Standard policy language does not contain a separate list of exclusions
for, respectively, defense and indemnity. Rather, the policy language
invokes the same exclusions for both; the promise to defend extends
to suits seeking damages "covered" under the policy.67
Having determined that defense insurance would contain exclu-
sions, and that the exclusions would generally tend to mirror the ex-
clusions to indemnity coverage, a further question remains. What is
the optimal decisional structure for coverage questions under defense
insurance? In all other forms of insurance, the answer to this is sim-
ple: whether or not the exclusion applies in a given case turns on the
actual facts, not on what anyone alleges those facts to be. For in-
stance, suppose that an insured under a disability policy submits a
claim on June 1 to the insurer, contending that he has been disabled
within the meaning of the policy since March 1. The insurer, after a
brief investigation, denies the claim on July 1. The insured sues, and
the case is litigated, resulting in a finding that the insured is not dis-
abled within the meaning of the policy.
We have no trouble concluding that the insurer has not breached
its obligations under the policy. No one would argue that the carrier's
obligations are as follows: The insurer must assume the truth of the
allegations set out in the claim filed June 1, and must begin to pay
benefits unless and until the insurer obtains an adjudication that the
64. See supra text accompanying note 51.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
66. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 46-47 (discussing the fact that toxic risks are difficult
to predict actuarially because of uncertainty concerning chemical properties, the way in
which hazardous waste migrates, and the scope of any given disaster). The frequency and,
possibly, the length and complexity of suits against an insured for pollution are also diffi-
cult to predict.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84 (quoting standard policy language).
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
insured is not in fact disabled within the meaning of the policy. In-
stead, everyone agrees that the insurer is free to make its decision
based on its assessment of the true facts, or on its prediction about
how the adjudication of the true facts will turn out.
Thus, the decisional structure that applies to most insurance obli-
gations is marked by two features: (1) coverage turns on the actual
facts; and (2) either party can seek an adjudication of those facts once
a disagreement over coverage arises.
Suppose that defense insurance were structured this same way. If
such insurance contained a business uses exclusion, or an intentional
harm exclusion, then whether the insurer owed a defense would turn
on whether, in fact, the injury occurred in conjunction with a business
use or the insured caused the harm intentionally. Because this struc-
ture matches that seen in other insurance contexts, as a threshold
matter one would expect to see a similar structure for defense insur-
ance. Instead, however, courts overwhelmingly follow a very different
approach, marked by two features: (1) whether the insurer owes a
defense at the outset, when given notice of the suit, depends on the
allegations of the lawsuit;68 and (2) the insurer is often not permitted
to seek an adjudication, in a separate declaratory judgment action, as
to whether the exclusion applies.69 As Part III will show, some ver-
sions of this approach are misguided. Yet, for reasons explained in
Part II, considerations of efficiency and fairness support a different
decisional structure for defense insurance than for other forms of
insurance.
C. Why the Decisional Structure Matters
It is important to understand why the decisional structure of de-
fense insurance profoundly influences not just litigation over insur-
ance policies, but also the tort litigation regime itself. Let us suppose
that we are choosing between two rules for implementing the defense
obligation: (1) the insurer must defend any time the plaintiff's plead-
ing alleges a claim that, if true, might create a covered liability; the
insurer cannot go behind the pleadings and escape the defense on
the basis of the actual facts relating to coverage in the case; or (2) the
insurer can avoid the defense on the basis of the actual facts relating
to coverage, so long as the insurer proves to be correct on the cover-
68. See infra text accompanying note 86.
69. See infra note 90 (citing cases that disallow simultaneous adjudication of the duty to
defend in overlapping scenarios) and text accompanying notes 117-125 (discussing
whether a simultaneous declaratory judgment action should be permitted in overlapping
scenarios).
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age issue. For several reasons, this choice will have important implica-
tions for the individual actors in this dispute and will systematically
affect tort litigation and liability insurance costs over the long haul.
First, the choice between the rules affects whether the insurer will
have reason to take defense costs into account in calculating the set-
tlement value of the underlying suit. Under the first rule, even if the
insurer believes it will ultimately prevail on the actual facts, the insurer
will have to bear the costs of defense in the tort suit. For instance,
suppose the expected value (given liability and damages) of the tort
suit is $50,000,7o the chances that the insured will win on coverage are
10%, the costs of defending the suit will equal $60,000, and the plain-
tiff submits a settlement demand of $30,000. The insurer's expected
indemnity payout is only $5000 (10% times the expected damages of
the case), but it will incur defense costs of $60,000.71 Thus, the in-
surer might rationally pay the plaintiff's demand. This response is
possible even though the insurer has collected liability insurance pre-
miums that take into account expected defense costs.
7 9
Second, the choice between the rules will also enhance the settle-
ment value of some cases in which coverage may be doubtful. Under
70. The expected value of the case will be the aggregate of a series of potential out-
comes-for example, a 10% chance of a verdict in the range of $100,000, a 20% chance of
a verdict in the range of $60,000, etc. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-12 (1984) (setting out the model for decid-
ing whether to litigate or settle based on the difference between an insurer's anticipated
payout and the cost of defending an action).
71. In the example, the insurer anticipates that defense costs will equal this amount
before the insurer can obtain an adjudication that the exclusion applies.
72. This point gains force from the general rule that, "if the insurer has a duty to
defend with regard to any aspect of a lawsuit, it has a duty to defend with regard to every
aspect of a lawsuit." 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4.01, at 199 (3d
ed. 1995). The rule stems from the fact that usually it is impossible for the insurer to
provide a defense as to only one claim within the suit filed against the insured. See id.
§ 4.13, at 203 (explaining that sometimes costs for defense of covered and noncovered
claims cannot be separated easily and that separate representation is not possible). Obvi-
ously, this rule magnifies the size of the prospective defense bill in a number of cases. At
times, if the defense of the uncovered claim can be separated, both conceptually and prac-
tically, from the defense of the covered claim, courts have allowed insurers to seek an
allocation and to pay only the defense costs of the covered claim. See id. § 4.13, at 201-04,
202 n.161; see also Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 417, 425 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991) (mentioning authority for allocation but deciding that the facts of the case
would not permit it), affd, 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992). In addition, a growing body of
authority supports an insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs that can be
allocated solely to claims as to which the insurer never owed a duty to defend. See Buss v.
Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 778 (Cal. 1997) (discussing.the elements necessary for reim-
bursement); William T. Barker, Insurer Recoupment of Defense Costs 8-22 (Oct. 9, 1997) (pa-
per presented at University of Texas School of Law, Second Annual Insurance Law
Institute). All of these rules affect the size of the defense bill that an insurer can anticipate
paying in a given case, but the basic point in text remains the same.
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the first rule, insurers more often will be obligated to provide a de-
fense for some period of time during the underlying suit. This, in
turn, means that insurers more often will be subject to the "duty to
settle" that virtually all jurisdictions impose on insurers defending a
case. v3 This duty is a justifiable response to concerns that the defend-
ing insurer will exercise its control over settlement inappropriately
when its interests conflict with those of the insured.7 ' Though vari-
ously framed among the jurisdictions, this duty usually requires the
company to evaluate a within-limits settlement demand as if the policy
contained no monetary limits. 75 If the company breaches this duty
and the case results in a verdict against the insured higher than the
policy's limit, the insurance company will be liable for the amount in
excess of the policy's limit and possibly for mental anguish and puni-
tive damages.76 When the insurer rejects an otherwise reasonable set-
tlement demand because of a coverage doubt, the insurer may be
liable for breach of the duty to settle if its coverage position turns out
to be mistaken. 77 Ex ante, of course, the insurer often cannot be cer-
tain, or even highly confident, of the outcome on the coverage issue.
Thus, when faced with a within-limits settlement demand that is rea-
sonable in light of the tort suit's potential liability and damages, the
insurer might rationally decide to forego its coverage question and
pay something to the tort plaintiff rather than risk a mistaken cover-
age call and potential duty-to-settle liability.
78
73. See 1 WINDT, supra note 72, § 5.01, at 295-96 & n.2 (discussing the duty to settle and
citing supporting cases from various jurisdictions).
74. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 188-93 (explaining the nature of the conflict of
interest and the solution sought through the duty to settle); Robert E. Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136, 1137-48 (1954) (discussing
the duty to settle). But see Sykes, supra note 4, at 1348 (questioning the need for extracon-
tractual regulation of settlement authority); Syverud, supra note 4, at 1125-67 (discussing
the sources of conflicts in settlements and the effects of the duty to settle).
75. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 112 [b] [ 1], at 765-67. This basic standard was first articu-
lated by Judge Keeton, then Professor Keeton. Keeton, supra note 74, at 1183-86.
76. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 112[f], at 773-74.
77. If the insurer proves to be incorrect and coverage does exist, then the rejection of a
reasonable demand within policy limits constitutes a breach of the duty to settle in a
number ofjurisdictions. See, e.g.,Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau,
538 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Cal. 1975) (in bank) (holding liable an insurer who failed to settle
based on what it thought to be a reasonable belief that a claim was not covered). Other
jurisdictions are somewhat more lenient and will impose duty-to-settle liability only if the
insurer's mistake on the coverage issue was unreasonable. See, e.g., Mowry v. Badger State
Mut. Cas. Co., 385 N.W.2d 171, 175-85 (Wis. 1986) (ordering the dismissal of a case in
which the insurer's failure to settle did not involve bad faith). Either way, the insurer
might reasonably decide to pay something to the tort plaintiff rather than risk a mistaken
coverage call and the resulting duty-to-settle liability.
78. See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 23, at 1733 (providing an example of a case in which the
duty to settle may give some settlement value even to claims of doubtful coverage).
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Third, the insurer often will not be allowed to litigate in a sepa-
rate and simultaneous lawsuit the contention that, given the actual
facts relating to coverage, the insurer owes no duty to defend. This
means that the coverage issue is more likely to linger, unresolved,
while the tort suit proceeds. As will be explained below, leaving the
coverage issue unresolved throughout the tort litigation may have sev-
eral effects: increasing the chances for structural collusion between
the tort plaintiff and the tort defendant; increasing the number of tort
cases that are tried rather than settled; increasing the level of insur-
ance payments for harms that are and should be uninsured; and in-
creasing the number of collateral disputes between insurer and
insured, and insured and defense counsel.79
II. MAPPING THE PROPER CONTOURS OF THE DuTY TO DEFEND:
OVERLAPPING SCENARIOS
In light of the importance of the decisional structure for the duty
to defend, we need to evaluate both the current structure and the
possible alternatives to it. In addition to considering the language of
standard policies and the interpretation that should be given to it, this
analysis will draw on two normative aims of insurance law: efficient
loss-spreading,8" and fairness as between insurer and insured.81
Most standard commercial and individual liability policies con-
tain language along the following lines:
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property dam-
age" for which any "insured" becomes legally responsible be-
cause of an auto accident .... We will settle or defend, as we
consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these dam-
ages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all de-
79. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the difficulty with leaving the coverage issue un-
resolved during the tort litigation).
80. The tort-insurance system, in theory, can advance efficiency in two ways: by deter-
ring accidents that, under a cost-benefit analysis, should be prevented (the deterrence
goal), and by spreading the risks and costs of accidents that cannot be efficiently prevented
(the spreading goal). See GuIo CA.AREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) (dis-
cussing deterrence and spreading goals). Insurance can promote efficient spreading be-
cause it allows individuals and corporations to transfer the risk of a large loss by paying
smaller, certain sums of money-the insurance premium-to an entity that can more effi-
ciently bear the risk. In evaluating the efficiency of various approaches to extrinsic evi-
dence, the focus will be on spreading rather than deterrence because the rules relating to
extrinsic evidence are unlikely to affect the level of deterrence that the system provides.
81. See ABRAHA, supra note 27, at 8-36 (discussing the aims of insurance law, including
economic efficiency, fair risk distribution, and equity between insurers and insureds).
Whether to allow declaratory judgments using extrinsic overlapping evidence primarily




fense costs we incur.... We have no duty to defend any suit
or settle any claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage"
not covered under this policy.82
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an "in-
sured" for damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
damage" caused by an "occurrence" to which this coverage
applies, we will: . . .Provide a defense at our expense by
counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent.83
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or
"property damage" to which this insurance applies. We will
have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking those
damages.84
Notice that all versions tie the insurer's obligation to what the
plaintiffs suit alleges or seeks, not to the substantive merit of the
plaintiff's allegations. The second is most explicit in this respect,
given the "groundless, false, or fraudulent" clause, but the others also
refer to the allegations or to what the plaintiffs suit seeks.
With this language in mind, recall again that two features are crit-
ical to the decisional structure of defense insurance.85 The first is the
82. ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 9, at 3 (reprinting personal auto
policy).
83. Id. at 29 (reprinting standard homeowners' policy).
84. Id. at 198 (reprinting claims-made commercial general liability policy).
85. In addition to the two structural features of defense insurance on which this Article
focuses-the complaint allegation rule for determining whether coverage exists at the out-
set of the tort suit, and whether the insurer may adjudicate the duty to defend by means of
extrinsic evidence in a simultaneous declaratory judgment action-there is another key
structural question: whether the plaintiff should be able to name the insurer as a defend-
ant in the tort suit. Most insurance policies provide a "no action" clause that disallows any
action against the insurer until the insured's liability has been established by a trial or a
settlement approved by the insurer. See id. at 208 (reprinting a commercial liability policy
containing such a clause). A common explanation for the clause is insurers' fears that
their involvement in the tort suit would result in higher or more frequent awards. See
JERRY, supra note 17, § 84[b], at 548. A handful ofjurisdictions, however, have statutes that
permit direct actions. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West 1995) (making the insurer
directly liable for the amount of the policy to third parties injured by the insured).
The no-action clause, and the insurer concerns that motivate it, are only a partial
explanation for this feature of the tort and liability insurance regime. If including the
insurer in the tort suit would greatly reduce the costs associated with lingering coverage
disputes-costs outlined infra text accompanying notes 150-164-one would expect to see
pressure for change. For instance, courts might invalidate the no-action clause as against
public policy. Or the marketplace itself could be expected to effect changes to the no-
action clause if the costs of the no-action prohibition were sufficiently high.
On reflection, one can see that allowing a direct action would not be a simple cure for
the knotty issues raised by lingering coverage disputes. Suppose the plaintiff sues both the
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test for determining if a duty to defend exists at the outset, when the
insurer first receives notice of a suit against the insured. The almost
universally-used approach is the eight-corners rule: one takes the alle-
gations in the plaintiff's complaint, assumes the truth of those allega-
tions without resorting to evidence extrinsic to the complaint, and
then asks whether these allegations, if true, would establish a liability
covered under the policy. 8 Suppose, for instance, that the accident
involves a boat that is insured under a policy containing a business
purposes exclusion. If the plaintiff's pleading states that the boat was
being used for recreational purposes, or if the pleading is ambiguous
or silent on the recreational versus business use issue, in mostjurisdic-
tions the insurer will owe a defense under the eight-corners rule.87 In
addition, if only one of the claims contained in the lawsuit triggers the
duty to defend, the insurer must provide a defense with respect to the
insured and the insurer, and that coverage as well as liability is contested. If a single trial
were to address both issues, then the insurer might be an adversary to the insured on an
issue that is intertwined with the issues involved in the tort suit. This is the same problem
that will be discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 114-115. One way to avoid this
is to allow a direct action, but then to bifurcate the trial into coverage and liability issues.
However, this raises many of the same problems, discussed later, presented by the separate
adjudication of coverage and liability. See infra text accompanying notes 150-164.
86. See I WINDT, supra note 72, § 4.01, at 149-50 & n.11; see, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1949); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); George Muhlstock & Co. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 502 N.Y.S.2d 174, 178-79 (App. Div. 1986).
87. Courts have traditionally resolved ambiguities in the pleadings in favor of finding a
duty to defend. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 111 [c] [3], at 736; see, e.g., Hecla Mining, 811 P.2d
at 1089 (stating that, if there is some doubt as to whether a covered theory has been al-
leged, the insurer owes a defense). But see, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants
Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (narrowing the de-
gree of ambiguity that is sufficient to trigger the duty to defend, and holding that allega-
tions must be sufficiently specific to "create that degree of doubt which compels resolution
of the issue for the insured").
Most jurisdictions recognize a significant caveat to the complaint allegation rule. If
the pleadings do not allege a potentially covered claim, but the insurer has knowledge of
extrinsic facts that indicate a reasonable possibility of coverage, then the insurer has a duty
to defend. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 93 (N.Y.
1991) (adopting the approach that the insurer must "provide a defense when it has actual
knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage"). Some courts, hold-
ing that the duty to defend exists when the insurer should have known the extrinsic facts,
impose on insurers an obligation to investigate these facts. See id. at 93 n.2 (citing cases).
Courts and scholars generally agree that this exception to the complaint allegation
rule promotes both efficiency and fairness. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 201-03 (stating
that only when an insurer finds it advantageous to defend will all resources be utilized);
Fisher, supra note 8, at 146-49 (outlining the development of the duty to defend).
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entire claim"8 because, in general, it is not possible to defend only the
potentially covered claim.8
9
The second feature critical to the decisional structure of defense
insurance is whether, even if the eight-corners rule governs at the out-
set, the insurer may adjudicate the duty to defend by means of extrin-
sic evidence in a declaratory judgment suit. Courts are currently split
on whether and when this is possible. Most courts disallow the simul-
taneous adjudication of the duty to defend on the basis of extrinsic
facts when those facts overlap with facts at issue in the tort suit.9 ° A
few courts, however, permit simultaneous adjudication. 1 In someju-
risdictions, this issue remains unsettled or unaddressed. 2
Both of these decisional features are easily explained and justified
when an insurer's only reason for contesting a defense obligation is
the substantive weakness of the underlying suit. For instance, suppose
88. See 1 WINDT, supra note 72, § 4.12, at 199; see, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 1978) (providing an example of when a
duty to defend all claims was triggered by a single claim); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara
B., 846 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (same).
89. See 1 WINDT, supra note 72, § 4.13, at 203. If the defense of the uncovered claim
can be separated, both conceptually and practically, from the defense of the covered claim,
courts have allowed insurers to seek an allocation and to pay only the defense costs of the
covered claim. See id. § 4.13, at 201-04; see, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins.
Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1280 (NJ. 1992) (requiring the insurance company to pay only those
defense costs associated with claims covered under the policy). Recent authority supports
an insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs that can be allocated entirely to
the claims that the insurer never owed a duty to defend. See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court,
939 P.2d 766, 768-69 (Cal. 1997) (holding that an insurer may seek reimbursement for cost
of defending claims not potentially covered under the policy).
90. See, e.g., North E. Ins. Co. v. Northern Brokerage Co., 780 F. Supp. 318, 321 (D. Md.
1991) (providing an example of when separate adjudication is not permitted); Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (discussing the
problems of allowing separate adjudication and the need for a stay of the declaratory ac-
tion). See generally 2 WINDT, supra note 72, § 8.04, at 8 (discussing the split in authority over
whether to allow simultaneous adjudication of the duty to defend).
91. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983-84 (10th Cir. 1994)
(permitting a separate declaratory judgment action); Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Kirkwood, 729 F.2d 61, 62-64 (1st Cir. 1984) (same); Group Ins. Co. v. Morelli, 314
N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (same); Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, 507 N.E.2d
1118, 1122-23 (Ohio 1987) (same); Reisen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 302 S.E.2d 529, 533-34
(Va. 1983) (same).
92. See, e.g., Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex.
1997) (per curiam) (ruling that the coverage issue can sometimes be adjudicated in a
declaratory judgment action before the completion of the underlying tort suit, and sug-
gesting but not deciding the guidelines for when this should be permitted). In Florida, the
appellate courts are split. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1006 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc) (allowing a declaratory judgment action to proceed in an
overlapping case when the case involves alternative, mutually exclusive theories of liability,
such as allegations of both intent and negligence) with Irvine v. Prudential Property & Cas.
Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (expressly disagreeing with Conde).
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an insurer wished to deny a defense because the statute of limitations
had run on the theory of liability, or because the insured was not neg-
ligent. The standard policy language clearly ties the insurer's defense
obligations to the claimant's allegations, not to the substantive merit
of those allegations.93 In addition, as noted in the previous subpart,
insureds would wish to purchase, and insurers would be willing to sell,
defense insurance that extended to suits lacking in substantive
merit.94 Thus, reliance on the complaint's allegations rather than the
actual facts is an appropriate choice in this circumstance. Nor should
the insurer be allowed to file a declaratory judgment suit seeking a
ruling that the insurer owes no duty to defend because the underlying
tort suit lacks merit.
It is harder to explain this decisional structure, however, when
the insurer does not merely dispute the substantive strength of the
plaintiff's claim, but wishes to deny a defense on the basis of actual
(not alleged) facts that relate to coverage. To explore the decisional
structure in such cases, it is important at the outset to note that deni-
als on the basis of coverage fall into two categories. First, in overlap-
ping scenarios, the insurer contests coverage on the basis of extrinsic
facts that are also relevant to the underlying liability suit; that is, they
may affect the strength or weakness of the insured's defense to the
liability suit. Second, in nonoverlapping or coverage-only cases, the
insurer disputes coverage on the basis of extrinsic facts that do not
affect the merits of the underlying tort suit. For instance, whether a
driver had permission of the named insured to drive the latter's car
would not have any bearing on liability or damages in the tort suit and
would relate only to coverage. But whether dumping occurred gradu-
ally could relate both to the merits of the tort case and to coverage.
The remainder of this Part will discuss overlapping situations. Part III
will discuss coverage-only situations.
A. The Test at the Outset for Overlapping Cases
in overlapping cases, should the complaint allegation rule govern
the carrier's defense obligation at the outset, or should the carrier be
allowed to deny a defense on the basis of the actual extrinsic facts
relating to coverage?95 As noted, the latter approach would match the
93. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
95. In a recent article, Professor Randall argues that the actual facts should govern the
duty to defend in all cases. See Randall, supra note 8, at 254-64. My analysis, developed
independently of hers, reaches the same conclusion with respect to nonoverlapping cases,
but takes a different view as to overlapping scenarios.
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decisional structure that applies to other insurance promises. 6 The
carrier promises that it will provide a benefit upon the happening of a
covered condition; the carrier can deny that it is liable for the benefit.
The carrier will be liable for that denial only if-in a suit by the in-
sured against the carrier-the carrier loses on its noncoverage conten-
tion (the contention that the insured gave late notice, or that an
exclusion applies).
An initial consideration is the language of the policy itself. Most
courts interpret standard policy language to require use of the com-
plaint allegation approach even when the insurer has a doubt about
coverage. 97 Judge Learned Hand offered a classic exposition of this
view:
This language means that the insurer will defend the suit, if
the injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an
injury "covered" by the policy; it is the claim which deter-
mines the insurer's duty to defend; and it is irrelevant that
the insurer may get information from the insured, or from
any one else, which indicates, or even demonstrates, that the
injury is not in fact "covered." The insurer has promised to
relieve the insured of the burden of satisfying the tribunal
where the suit is tried, that the claim as pleaded is
"groundless." 8
Yet the argument from policy language presents a problem.
There is a tension between two strands of the standard policy lan-
guage. On one hand, the language ties the defense obligation to what
the plaintiff's claim alleges the insurer will defend a suit "asking for
these damages"; the insurer will defend the claim even if it is "ground-
less, false, or fraudulent."99 On the other hand, the duty to defend
seems linked to coverage the insurer has no duty to defend any claim
"not covered under this policy"; the insurer has a duty to defend a
"claim... for damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage'
caused by an 'occurrence' to which this coverage applies."1 ° These latter
96. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
97. See JERRY, supra note 17, § 111[c] [21, at 735; see also All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971) ("Since'the policy makes the duty to defend
rest upon the allegations of the injured party, the Court has no authority to look beyond
the allegations to the actual facts.").
98. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1949). The language in
the policy stated that the insurer will "defend * * * any suit against the Insured alleging
injury. .. covered by this Policy * * * even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent."
Id. at 751 (star ellipsis in original).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 (quoting policy language).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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phrases beg the central question: when, if at all, can the actual facts
relating to coverage rather than the alleged facts be used to deter-
mine the duty to defend?
To supply a firmer basis for an answer, we might consider extrin-
sic evidence relating to these policy provisions, employ the doctrine of
contra proferentum, or look to the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured. I am unaware of extrinsic evidence that casts helpful light on
the connection between the duty to defend and the actual facts rele-
vant to coverage. 01 Nor are the principles of contra proferentum and
reasonable expectations especially useful here. Contra proferentum in-
structs us, in cases of ambiguity, to select the reading that favors the
insured, a directive that usually leads to the choice that gives the most
coverage, ex post.10 2 Yet our question at this juncture is to sketch the
ideal contours of defense insurance, and thus the major concern
should be what insureds, ex ante, would desire by way of such
insurance. 
03
101. One point worth noting in this respect is that the standard policy language relating
to the duty to defend has not changed despite several major modifications of standard
policies over the years. Nor, apparently, have insurers sought changes to this standard
language of the defense obligation. See JERRY, supra note 17, § 111 (a], at 729-32 (indicating
that the language remains in current standard contracts). Yet most courts have been ap-
plying the eight-corners rule for many years. See id. § 111 [c] [1], at 734 (discussing the rule
and listing cases). Thus, insurers' inaction could be seen as acquiescence to use of the
eight-corners rule.
Yet this conclusion seems overdrawn. First, in a number of jurisdictions, courts have
allowed departures from the eight-corners rule in limited instances of coverage-only facts.
See id. § 111 [c] [2], at 736. Second, insurers have often been allowed to litigate the duty to
defend by means of extrinsic evidence in a declaratory judgment proceeding when the
evidence relates only to coverage. See infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text. Third,
some jurisdictions permit the insurer to litigate the duty to defend by means of extrinsic
overlapping evidence in a declaratory judgment proceeding. See supra note 91 and accom-
panying text. Thus, insurers' continued use of the standard duty to defend language does
not necessarily indicate their acquiescence to an eight-corners rule that operates fully at
the outset and throughout the litigation.
102. For discussion of contra proferentum in insurance law contexts, see KEETON & WIDISs,
supra note 16, § 6.3(a) (2), at 629 (discussing the "thousands of judicial opinions" constru-
ing ambiguous policy language against the insurer); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION
OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAw AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS § 5.2, at
181-85 (1994); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 531 (1996); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).
103. This is not an argument that achieving equity between insured and insurer in a
given case is an irrelevant goal, or that equity in a given case should be sacrificed for
considerations of efficiency in the long run. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 10-18,
31-36 (discussing the systemic aims of insurance law, and specifically including economic
efficiency and equity between the parties). My aim at this point is to determine which
structure of defense insurance is optimal and fair from an ex ante perspective, not to an-
swer an interpretive issue in a given case-a task for which the doctrine of contra proferen-
turn seems more suited.
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As to reasonable expectations, 10 4 neither of the interpretations
arising from the actual policy language conflicts with concrete expec-
tations that insureds have about the defense. 10 5 In addition, as Profes-
sor Kenneth Abraham has argued, the strong version of reasonable
expectations is less an inquiry into insureds' concrete expectations
than a method of achieving other goals, such as mandating appropri-
ate levels of coverage or adequate information to the insured.1"6 To
the extent that these other goals are relevant to the question we are
considering, they will be considered explicitly.
Presumably, defense insurance governed by the actual facts
would be cheaper than defense insurance under the complaint allega-
tion rule. The insured, then, would prefer an actual facts approach
unless this would deliver inadequate coverage or pose real risks of de-
cisional abuse. One might argue that an actual facts approach would
necessarily offer inadequate defense coverage. Because the actual
facts may be disputed until they are adjudicated, an actual facts stan-
dard means that we cannot know whether the insurer owed a duty to
defend until the coverage issue is adjudicated. And the defense, to be
meaningful, needs to be provided when the lawsuit is first filed.
Courts often stress this point.1 0 '
Yet this same point is true of other types of insurance. The in-
sured who files a disability claim needs the insurance payments for lost
wages at that point, not later. If coverage is contested, however, the
insured will not know whether coverage exists until the issue of disa-
bility or coverage is actually adjudicated. Yet disability insurers are not
required to assume the truth of the insured's allegations. Rather, an
insurer may, upon peril of liability if incorrect, deny a claim based on
its assessment of how the coverage adjudication will turn out. Using
an actual facts approach, therefore, does not mean that the insurer's
duty attaches only once the actual facts are known. Instead, the duty
104. The classic exposition of the doctrine appears in Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. Rv. 961 (1970). For more recent analy-
ses, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Rea-
sonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. Rv. 1151, 1168 (1981); Roger C. Henderson,
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law after Two Decades, 51 O1I4o ST. L.J.
823, 826 (1990).
105. Probably the only concrete expectation that insureds have about the defense obli-
gation is that the insurer owes a defense even if the lawsuit is a frivolous one.
106. ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 110-12 (arguing that, in duty to defend cases, the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations has been employed to create the coverage that courts find
desirable and sensible, not to protect concrete expectations of the insured).
107. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993)
(in bank) (stating that "[i] mposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford
the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf').
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still attaches immediately if there is coverage, although the parties op-
erate in the face of uncertainty about whether coverage exists.
There is, of course, a chance that the insurer will abuse its discre-
tion in deciding whether to defend a case. Although abuses can and
do occur, this does not explain why we would treat this decision-a
decision about exclusions in litigation insurance-differently than
noncoverage decisions in other settings, such as disability insurance,
or homeowner's property protection. Concerns about decisional
abuse and the special injuries it poses to vulnerable insureds have
spawned a whole battery of extracontractual protections in the form
of statutes, 10 8 regulations, 10 9 and common law bad faith protec-
tions.110 To the extent necessary, the same protections could be ap-
plied (and are in many jurisdictions) to decisions about the defense
obligation.111 For example, if the carrier was ultimately wrong in its
position that an accident stemmed from the noncovered business ac-
tivities of the insured, then the carrier would pay contractual and ex-
tracontractual damages. Indeed, the carrier arguably has greater
incentive to make the right call on the duty to defend than on other
insurance promises. The insurer that denies a defense loses the right
to control the defense and settlement, and in some jurisdictions may
lose its coverage defense if the denial is wrongful. 112
There is, however, reason to treat defense insurance differently.
The insured who is wrongfully denied a defense in an overlapping
108. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b) (4) (West Supp. 1998)- (enumerat-
ing as an unfair settlement practice, inter alia, "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become
reasonably clear").
109. See, e.g., ARiz. ADMIN. CODE R20-5-163 (1968) (defining "bad faith" and "unfair
claim processing practices" and granting the Industrial Commission authority to award
damages to victims of such practices).
110. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 173-206 (discussing history and rationales for ex-
tracontractual regulation of the claims process); JERRY, supra note 17, § 25 [G] (discussing
history and current doctrinal boundaries of bad faith law); Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of
Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformu-
lating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4 (1992) (discussing "the common-
law and statutory background of the tort of bad faith in first-party insurance situations,
analyz[ing] the varying standards of culpability... [,] and suggest[ing] a uniform statutory
solution to the problems created by the[se] varying standards"); Symposium on the Law of
Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1203 (1994) (discussing theory and
doctrine of bad faith in insurance and contract).
111. See LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAIM, supra note 8, at 119 (discussing the conse-
quences of a wrongful refusal to defend); Karon 0. Bowdre, "Litigation Insurance": Conse-
quences of an Insurance Company's Wrongful Refusal to Defend, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 743, 761-66
(1996) (discussing contractual and tort remedies for a breach of the duty to defend).
112. See Bowdre, supra note 111, at 757-59 (setting forth various consequences to the
insurer of an erroneous decision not to defend).
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scenario might be handicapped in pursuing the remedies that in the-
ory are available to her. Suppose that the insured has been sued for
pollution, and the case against her is pending. Her carrier has denied
a defense, and she has had to cope with this as best she can-for ex-
ample, by hiring a lawyer on her own. If she wishes to pursue the
insurance company, she must file another lawsuit, while the pollution
suit against her is pending.11
3
Yet the facts and theories at issue in the coverage suit will overlap
with facts and theories at issue in the underlying tort suit. Such over-
lapping issues could include whether the insured dumped pollutants
onto her neighbor's land; for how long she did so; how much and
exactly when; and whether the insured caused the harm intentionally.
Under an actual facts approach-as distinct from the complaint alle-
gation approach-the insurer would be allowed, in the suit over the
duty to defend, to bring its considerable resources and expertise to
bear on exploring these factual issues. This could harm the insured in
the underlying suit in several ways. It could generate evidence that
would harm the insured in the underlying case. It could result in a
finding on the intentional harm issue that would be given collateral
estoppel effect in the tort suit (if the tort plaintiff were joined as co-
defendant in the declaratory judgment proceeding).' 14 It could stra-
113. Another option for the insured is to settle the case. If the insured believes she is
not liable, however, or if the insured and plaintiff disagree over the proper settlement
amount, the insured should not be forced into settling just because she is unable to muster
a defense. Another settlement variation is the following: plaintiff and insured settle the
case and enter an agreed judgment; plaintiff executes a covenant not to execute against
the insured for this sum; and in exchange for the covenant the insured assigns to the
plaintiff her contractual and extracontractual rights against the carrier.
Although this route is often taken, it cannot be viewed as a general solution to wrong-
ful denials of the defense obligation. These arrangements have rightly raised concerns
about the potential for structural collusion. As a result, some jurisdictions arguably disal-
low them, and other jurisdictions police them heavily. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 713-15 (Tex. 1996) (invalidating the use of pre-trial assignments
in some cases, although leaving open the permissibility of these arrangements in situations
when the insurer refuses a defense). See generally Chris Wood, Note, Assignments of Rights
and Covenants Not to Execute in Insurance Litigation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1373, 1377, 1410 (1997)
(discussing various approaches to the competing concerns raised by assignment-covenant
arrangements and "suggest[ing] a set of rules by which a desirable balance between the
interests of insureds and carriers may be achieved").
114. SeeJERRY, supra note 17, § 114[c][4], at 800 ("[T]he holding in the declaratory
judgment [coverage] action might collaterally estop the parties in the underlying action
on certain fact questions."). Most courts will allow or require the tort plaintiff to be joined
as a co-defendant in the declaratoryjudgment action if that action will adjudicate coverage.
See, e.g., Constitution Assoc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 562 (Colo. 1996)
(concluding that "an allegedly injured party in the underlying action[] may defend an
anticipatory declaratory judgment as long as the action is properly initiated by a party with
a legally cognizable claim"); cf Home Ins. Co. v. Gephart, 639 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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tegically undermine the insured's defensive posture in the tort case.
For instance, the insured's best defense to the coverage issue might be
to argue that the insured was, at most, negligent. Presenting this argu-
ment, however, could undermine the insured's effort, in the tort case,
to show that he was not negligent at all." 5
This insured, then, is both like and unlike insureds under other
types of policies. Like other insureds, she has been denied a benefit
at a time when it has great importance to her; she must pursue her
contract and tort remedies to receive what she is owed, if the insurer is
wrong. But, unlike other insureds, the very pursui t of these remedies
may pose the distinct and considerable burden of disadvantaging her
defense of the ongoing tort litigation.
There is no satisfactory way of eliminating this burden. It is of
little comfort to the insured to tell her that she could wait until the
end of the tort litigation to pursue her claims against the carrier. Nor
is there a way to build a solid wall between the duty-to-defend lawsuit
and the plaintiffs lawsuit against the insured. Finally, it is not possible
to shape the actual facts approach in a way that would avoid these
problems in all cases." 6
These concerns make a solid case for retaining the complaint al-
legation approach when the insurer's coverage argument depends on
extrinsic facts that overlap with the liability case. Insurers, to be sure,
might still improperly deny a defense even under a complaint allega-
tion approach. But the insured could pursue the insurer without trig-
gering the need for factual inquiry into and adjudication of the very
facts that also are at stake in the tort suit.
B. Use of Extrinsic Evidence in a Declaratory Judgment Proceeding
Even if the complaint allegation rule governs at the outset, a fur-
ther question is whether the insurer should be permitted to adjudi-
cate the duty to defend via extrinsic evidence in a declaratory
judgment proceeding before the completion of the underlying tort
suit. This would be tantamount to allowing the insurer to adjudicate
the coverage issue in a simultaneous declaratory judgment action. For
App. 1994) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of insurer's declaratory judgment action, in
part because the plaintiff from the underlying suit had not been joined as a party to the
proceedings).
115. For discussion of this problem, see Hartford Insurance Group v. District Court, 625
P.2d 1013, 1016 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finney, 770 P.2d
460, 461, 466 (Kan. 1989).
116. Even if the findings in the coverage suit were not given collateral estoppel effect




instance, if the insurer were allowed to adjudicate the intentional
harm issue in the declaratory judgment action, a ruling favorable to
the insurer would resolve not just the duty to defend, but also the duty
to indemnify. As noted before, although most courts disallow the ad-
judication of the duty to defend via extrinsic evidence in an overlap-
ping case, others permit it, and the issue remains unsettled in some
jurisdictions.1"7 Analysts also are in disagreement over the proper
approach.1 18
Addressing this issue implicates two related but distinct bodies of
law: insurance law, and the law relating to declaratory judgments. Of
course, whether courts should exercise their discretion to allow de-
claratory judgment proceedings in this or any other context is ulti-
mately governed by the federal declaratory judgment act1 1 9 or the
117. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
118. See 2 WINDT, supra note 72, § 8.04, at 8 (noting that the majority of cases "have held
that a declaratory judgment should not be entered if it depends on the resolution of fac-
tual disputes that are at issue in the underlying action"); DavisJ. Howard, Declaratory Judg-
ment Coverage Actions: A Multistate Survey and Analysis and State Versus Federal Law Comparison,
21 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 13, 26 (1994) ("Treatises, rather than cases, have dealt in greater
depth with this issue, the consensus being that [declaratory judgment actions] should be
dismissed or stayed in -the presence of factual intermixture that may prejudice the insured
.... "). But see Alan M. Posner, Prematurity ofDeclaratoiyJudgment Actions: Does State or Federal
Law Apply?, BIaEF, Fall 1995, at 15, 40 (arguing that adjudication of the coverage issue,
even in overlapping contexts, can permit a more prompt resolution of the disputed issues
and can prevent a "negligence" claim from being used as a device to obtain coverage for
blatantly purposeful acts); GregorJ. Schwinghammer, Jr., Comment, Insurance Litigation in
Florida: DeclaratoryJudgments and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MihMi L. REv. 945, 978-79 (1996)
(proposing that insurers be allowed to seek declaratory judgments even when the coverage
issue overlaps with the tort suit, so long as the insured is not bound by findings in the
coverage suit).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994). For a recent discussion of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act in the context of insurance, see Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
In Wilton, the Court rejected the insurer's argument that a district court with jurisdiction
over the declaratory judgment proceeding should not stay or dismiss that proceeding un-
less "exceptional circumstances" exist. Id. at 287-88. The Court held that district courts
have substantial latitude to dismiss or stay a declaratory judgment action, even when the
action satisfies the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 289-90 (relying on
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)). According to the Wilton Court,
Brillhart counsels against allowing the declaratory judgment action to proceed "at least
where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of
the same state law issues is pending in state court." Id. at 283. Wilton, however, does not try
to delineate the complete boundaries relating to the use of declaratory judgments in insur-
ance contexts. See id. at 290.
The Wilton opinion does not settle the fate of declaratoryjudgment actions of the type
discussed in this Article. In Wilton, the insurer had denied a duty to defend, and the un-
derlying tort suit had proceeded to judgment; the insurer then filed a federal declaratory
judgment action to resolve the coverage issue, and the insured filed a coverage suit in state
court. See id. at 279-80. Thus, the state and federal actions were essentially parallel pro-
ceedings. See id. at 283 (citing Brillhart for authority to stay a federal declaratory judgment
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state declaratory judgment statute121 under which the insurer seeks to
proceed. Yet, in deciding whether to allow the declaratory judgment
action under state or federal laws, courts apply a number of guide-
lines, such as whether the action would help to clarify legal relations,
whether it would amount to duplicative or piecemeal litigation, or
whether it would be superior to other alternatives. 121 In applying
many of these guidelines to the extrinsic evidence question, insurance
considerations are crucial. 1 2 2 For instance, whether the declaratory
action when a state suit involving the same parties and the same issues is pending). By
contrast, when an insurer files a declaratory judgment relating to the duty to defend and to
coverage when the state suit is still pending, the state suit does not represent a parallel
proceeding. The insurer cannot be a party to the tort suit in most jurisdictions, and the
tort suit generally will not adjudicate coverage issues. See supra note 85.
120. Over forty states have adopted some or all of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act. See Dianne K. Ericsson, DeclaratoryJudgment: Is It a Real or Illusory Solution ?, 23 TORT &
INS. L.J. 161, 162 (1987). Under section 6 of the Uniform Act, "The court may refuse to
render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if ren-
dered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding." UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT § 6, 12A U.L.A. (West 1996).
121. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288 ("In the declaratory judgment context, the normal prin-
ciple that federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to consid-
erations of practicality and wise judicial administration."); Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52
F.3d 689, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting matters which the federal court should con-
sider when deciding whether or not to refuse a declaration); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1994) (approving the list of factors that the Sixth
Circuit considers when deciding whether or not to hear a declaratory action); Terra Nova
Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1224-25 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting the general guide-
lines of the Third Circuit for the exercise of discretion under the Declaratory Judgment
Act); 10A C. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2759-2760 (1998) (dis-
cussing standards under the Federal Act); see also Constitution Assoc. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 560-61 (Colo. 1996) (noting that, among the requirements of the
Colorado statute, courts should not render a declaratory judgment unless it will fully and
finally resolve uncertainty and controversy between all parties with a substantial interest).
For discussion of declaratory judgment actions in insurance settings, see Raphael
Cotkin & Philip S. Guiterrez, Walking the Tightrope: Contesting Coverage During the Underlying
Case, in LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAIM! DENIAL OF COVERAGE & DUTY TO DEFEND 145,
147 (A.B.A., Tort & Insurance Practice Section, 1992); Ericsson, supra note 120, at 162;
Howard, supra note 118, at 13; Posner, supra note 118, at 15; Schwinghammer, supra note
118, at 946.
122. See, e.g., Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1225 (noting that, in exercising discretion under
the federal act, courts properly include some considerations that are more insurance-spe-
cific); Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kirkwood, 729 F.2d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 1984)
(stating that the caselaw under the federal statute "give[s] these general principles a some-
what more specific meaning in the context of insurance disputes").
One oft-cited case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
illustrates howjudicial discretion considers insurance issues in applying the Federal Declar-
atory Judgment Act. After considering issues of federal-state comity, the court noted that
resolving the issue of the insured's intent "in a separate federal court proceeding when a
similar issue involving the same evidence and essentially the same parties is pending in
state court.., causes this Court grave concern." Id. at 850. The court noted, however, that
because the tort suit would not resolve the coverage issue, dismissing the declaratoryjudg-
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judgment action would "serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
obligations and relationships among the parties"123 depends in part
on whether the use of extrinsic evidence in the declaratory judgment
would be consistent with the insurance policy, or whether it would
undermine the insured's reasonable expectations under the policy.124
Other guidelines concerning declaratory judgment actions seem
less related to insurance, and instead stem from considerations of fed-
eral-state comity or interference with adjudication in the underlying
lawsuit. For example, some federal courts have disallowed a declara-
tory judgment when it would adjudicate an unsettled issue of state
insurance law.125 This choice is based on considerations of federal
interference with the state adjudicative process, not considerations of
justice or efficiency in the tort liability insurance regime.
The following discussion explores the considerations that should
be most important in deciding whether to allow the declaratory judg-
ment option in overlapping cases. One caveat is necessary, however.
The discussion does not fully address considerations relating solely to
the relationship between federal and state courts. Rather, the main
question is the desirable boundaries of the duty to defend in light of
the goals of the tort liability regime, justice and efficiency. Once this
question is examined, considerations that relate solely to federal-state
relations (such as not tackling unsettled issues of state law) can be
added to the analysis.
1. The Disadvantages of the Declaratory Judgment Option for Overlap-
ping Cases.-In overlapping scenarios, allowing adjudication of the
ment action would only serve to force the parties to start a separate coverage suit in state
court. See id. at 851. Thus, the court indicated that, if it considered solely the issues of
efficiency and comity, it should permit the declaratoryjudgment. See id. Nonetheless, the
court stayed the declaratory judgment pending the outcome of the state tort action be-
cause "a trial at this point in the proceedings would place an unfair burden on the insured,
in violation of his expectations and of the policies favoring insurance against risks." Id.
123. Zavalis, 52 F.3d at 692.
124. See, e.g., Harris, 445 F. Supp. at 851 (noting that the use of a declaratory judgment
in this instance would defeat the reasonable expectations of the insured, and explaining
why this consideration is relevant to the exercise of discretion under the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act).
125. See, e.g., North E. Ins. Co. v. Northern Brokerage Co., 780 F. Supp. 318, 322 (D. Md.
1991) (noting that the question of which events trigger coverage implicates an important
issue of public policy and thus should be resolved by a state court); Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Alvarez, 669 F. Supp. 307, 311 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that the declaratory judgment
action "raises numerous difficult and complex ancillary issues of first impression under
state law which are better left for decision by state tribunals"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 707 (D. Haw. 1987) (agreeing that the declaratory judg-
ment should be stayed because, among other reasons, the federal courts "lack any signifi-
cant federal interest in deciding the state law issues which predominate in this case").
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duty to defend by means of extrinsic evidence in a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding presents several potential problems that bear exami-
nation. These problems fall under three categories: potential harm
to the insured; interference with the underlying tort proceeding; and
efficiency in the adjudicative process.
a. Potential Harm to the Insured.--Courts that reject the de-
claratory judgment option often cite concerns about harm to the in-
sured, ranging from the inconvenience and expense of defending an
additional lawsuit"' to the substantive disadvantage that the simulta-
neous suit might pose for the insured in the underlying suit. 2 7 The
possible harm to the insured should be evaluated in light of efficient
loss-spreading and fairness as between insurer and insured.12
The key question with respect to efficient loss-spreading is
whether the informed insured, ex ante, would purchase defense insur-
ance under which the insurer would be allowed to contest the duty to
defend by means of extrinsic evidence in a simultaneous declaratory
judgment action. This question bears on efficient loss-spreading be-
cause, if informed insureds (or some category thereof) would prefer
to purchase such defense insurance, then this form of defense insur-
ance represents the optimal level for at least some insureds.1 29 This
ex ante inquiry is different from asking whether the insured, once
faced with a lawsuit, would prefer the more protective form of defense
insurance; of course he would. The more appropriate focus, however,
is the content and scope of the defense insurance that the insured
would purchase in an actuarially fair insurance market.
We can plausibly presume that insureds would be charged higher
premiums for litigation insurance governed fully by the complaint al-
legation rule, and would pay lower premiums for defense insurance
that allowed adjudication of the duty to defend by means of extrinsic
evidence. This is because, under the latter approach, insurers would
more often be able to escape the duty to defend on the basis of extrin-
sic facts. Because potential defense costs would decline, the actuari-
ally fair premium of such insurance also should decline.
126. See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1090 n.11
(Colo. 1991) (en banc); Irvine v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579, 580
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Wyo. 1989).
127. See, e.g., Haris, 445 F. Supp. at 850.
128. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
129. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 228-45 (discussing which levels of liability awards com-
port with optimal loss-spreading); Priest, supra note 3, at 1556 (arguing that it would hurt
consumer interests to force individuals to purchase insurance more extensive than the
informed individual would wish).
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Even though such insurance should be cheaper, there is a serious
question whether, ex ante, insureds would prefer it. Allowing the si-
multaneous litigation of overlapping extrinsic evidence presents two
possible problems for the insured. The first is that the insurer be-
comes an adversary on an issue that relates to the tort suit. A second
problem is not so much the fact that the insurer can become an adver-
sary, but the timing of this relationship: The insurer is adverse to the
insured at the same time the tort suit is going on. 130
The latter problem is the troublesome one. In any insurance re-
lationship, the possibility exists that the insurer and insured will be-
come adversaries on a coverage issue. So this possibility, by itself, is
not a strong reason to disallow the declaratory judgment.13 1 Yet, this
possibility, if it occurs while the tort suit is pending, is troublesome for
several reasons. First, as explained earlier,1 2 litigating the coverage
question while the tort suit is still pending could undermine the in-
sured's defense in the tort suit. For instance, in a suit involving allega-
tions of negligence and intentional harm, the declaratory judgment
action could: result in a finding on the intentional harm issue that
would be given effect in the tort suit; generate proof that could be
used against the insured in the underlying tort suit; and strategically
undermine the insured's defensive posture in the tort case.
In other overlapping cases, this potential for undermining the in-
sured's defense in the tort suit seems unlikely. For instance, suppose
that the defendant is sued on a tort theory by an employee for an
injury that arguably did not occur in the course and scope of employ-
ment. The defendant employer's general liability insurer might pro-
vide a defense and then try to establish in the declaratory judgment
130. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of litigating
overlapping factual issues in the declaratory judgment action).
131. Consider what would happen if the insurer were not allowed to litigate a coverage
issue in a declaratory judgment action-for example, whether the insured intentionally
caused the harm. Then the tort suit would proceed, and the insurer would have to provide
a defense. Suppose the tort suit results in a finding that the injury was inflicted negligently
and that it was not intentional. Given the conflict of interest between the carrier and the
insured on the intentional harm issue, the tort suit's finding on this issue would not have
collateral estoppel effect if the insurer relinquished control of the defense in the face of
this conflict of interest. See 1 WINDT, supra note 72, § 6.22, at 430-31. Thus, in the coverage
suit following the tort suit, the insurer could be a full and formidable opponent to the
insured on the intentional harm issue.
Hence, dismissing the declaratory judgment action does not eliminate the prospect
that the insurer will become the insured's adversary on an issue that is also central to the
tort suit. The dismissal only postpones this prospect. The mere fact of insurer as adversary,
then, does not seem reason to disallow the use of the extrinsic evidence in the declaratory
judgment suit.
132. See infta text accompanying notes 114-115.
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action that the injury occurred within the course and scope of employ-
ment (and thus fell outside the general liability policy, and under the
coverage provided by the worker's compensation insurer). The em-
ployee plaintiff, however, would not be trying to establish the same
point in the tort suit. Instead, the plaintiff would argue that the injury
occurred outside the course and scope of employment, because with-
out this finding the plaintiff would be restricted to workers' compen-
sation benefits. Thus, the insurer would not be substantively aligned
with the plaintiff against the insured on an issue in the tort suit.
1 34
The most troublesome cases, then, are those in which the insurer's
position in the coverage suit might in some way undermine the
strength of the insured's defense as to liability or damages.
The simultaneous timing of declaratory judgment actions
presents a second problem: saddling the insured with sizable litiga-
tion costs at the very time when the insured expected to be relieved of
such costs. To evaluate the seriousness of this concern, we can draw a
rough but useful distinction between individual insureds, who realisti-
cally will not be able to bear additional litigation costs, and corporate
insureds, a category that includes corporations or individuals with as-
sets sufficient to finance litigation.
Consider the simultaneous litigation scenario involving an indi-
vidual insured. Recall, too, that we are evaluating a set of rules that
requires the insurer to provide a defense-based on the complaint
allegation rule-yet that allows the insurer to file a declaratory judg-
ment action and try to escape the duty to defend on the basis of the
extrinsic facts adjudicated in that action. Thus, by hypothesis, the in-
sured is being provided counsel-probably independent counsel-in
the underlying tort suit."3 5 Given this hypothesis, simultaneous litiga-
133. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 9, at 199 (reprinting commercial
general liability policy containing n exclusion for bodily injury to an employee arising out
of the course of employment by the insured).
134. For an overlapping fact case in which the overlapping facts were not contested, see
Hagen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 675 So. 2d 963, 964-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (en
banc). In Hagen, a commercial general liability policy excluded coverage for injuries aris-
ing out of the operation or use of any automobile by the insured. See id. at 965. The injury
occurred when workers were unloading carpet from one truck by tying one end of a rope
to the roll of carpet and the other end to the bumper of another truck, which then pulled
forward and thus pulled the carpet forward. See id. at 964. This could be seen as an over-
lapping fact case because some of the facts relating to coverage-for example, the employ-
ees' use of the truck to pull the carpet-also relate to the merits of the liability case. When
overlapping facts are not contested, the declaratory judgment should be allowed.
135. When a conflict of interest exists between the interests of the carrier and the in-
sured defendant, jurisdictions differ about the carrier's defense obligation. The predomi-
nant modem approach is that the carrier must pay for independent counsel when a
conflict of interests exists that would affect the way in which the defense is conducted. See
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tion might appear to pose a problem no different from that inherent
in any other insurance relationship: the need for the insured to incur
the costs of litigation against the insurer in a contested coverage ac-
tion. This is a problem that remedial schemes such as fee-shifting or
extracontractual liability in theory can address.
On inspection, however, the litigation costs of the simultaneous
declaratory judgment action pose a different problem. As noted, at
times the insurer in the declaratory judgment action will be taking a
position that aligns with or that assists the tort plaintiff's position in
the underlying litigation.136 If litigation costs prevent the insured
from mustering any defense or an adequate defense to the declaratory
judgment, this will affect more than the insured's chances in the cov-
erage dispute. It could also harm the insured in the tort suit. As
noted before, some harmful spillover is possible whenever the in-
surer's position in the declaratory judgment action aligns with or as-
sists the tort plaintiff's position in the underlying case.137 This
potential for spillover becomes even more troublesome when we real-
ize that lack of funds will prevent some individual insureds from
mounting an adequate defense to the declaratory judgment action.
By contrast, corporate insureds presumably would be able to
mount an adequate defense in the declaratory judgment action.
Thus, for such insureds, the need to incur litigation costs to fight the
declaratoryjudgment action would be functionally similar to the prob-
lem that inheres in any insurance relationship: the possibility that the
insured will not obtain the promised contractual benefits without first
incurring litigation costs. Although this problem is not insignificant,
it is not unique to the third-party coverage context, and presumably
could be addressed as the problem is in other contexts. 3 '
In sum, simultaneous declaratory judgment actions relating to
overlapping facts are not troublesome solely because the insured is an
adversary to the insurer on a coverage question. This potential exists
in all insurance contexts. Rather, the timing is troublesome. First, for
all insureds-individual and corporate-there is potential for spill-
over whenever the insurer's position in the declaratory judgment ac-
tion undermines the defendant's defense in the underlying lawsuit.
Second, for individual insureds, this spillover concern is exacerbated
1 WINDT, supra note 72, §§ 4.20-4.22 (discussing this approach); Barker, When Does the In-
surer Lose, supra note 8, at 470-79 (providing a thorough analysis of how a conflict of inter-
est relates to the insurer's defense obligation).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
138. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
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because a lack of assets might prevent such insureds from presenting
an adequate defense in the declaratory judgment proceeding.
Allowing declaratory judgment actions in all overlapping cases,
then, would not be an attractive approach to insureds ex ante. For
individual insureds, the security afforded by defense insurance would
have a substantial gap: in some cases, the individual will face an addi-
tional lawsuit that is filed by the insurer and that poses the risk of
undermining or weakening the insured's position in the tort suit.
This problem is less significant for corporate insureds that can be con-
fident of mounting an adequate defense to the declaratory judgment
proceeding. Even these insureds, however, might be willing to pay a
higher premium to avoid the chance that the declaratory judgment
proceeding will weaken or undermine the insured's substantive
chances in the tort lawsuit. 139
2. Efficiency in the Adjudicative Process.--One could also argue
that the declaratory judgment option would be an inefficient use of
judicial resources for two reasons. One variation of the argument is
that deciding the coverage issue before the completion of the tort suit
is less efficient than deferring the coverage issue until after comple-
tion of the tort suit. 4 ' As one court explained, "Since there is a possi-
bility that the tort claim may be proven invalid in state court, there is
no need to litigate in advance the issue of who should pay for the tort
claim if it proves to be valid."141 The point has a surface appeal, but
contains gaps. First, the argument at most asserts that coverage does
not need to be adjudicated, for purposes of the duty to indemnify,
before the completion of the tort suit. It tells us nothing about
139. These points about potential harm to the insured's defense also bear on another
aim of insurance law besides efficiency and risk distribution, namely, achieving fairness
between insurers and insureds. See ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 31-32. Thus, our inquiry
must focus not only on whether a fully informed individual would purchase such defense
insurance, but also whether insureds under current policies can be said to have made
informed decisions to purchase such insurance. See id. at 31-33 (considering the issue of
equity between insurers and insureds by discussing, among other things, the
"[i]nformation [i]mbalance" and the "[d]isparity of [b]argaining [plower"); see also All-
state Ins. Co. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that "the insured
could not possibly have anticipated that the very resources for which he bargained would
be turned against him and used to establish his liability").
140. See, e.g., Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Wyo. 1989) (stating that
the "[b]enefit in duplicate litigation is not discernable when the liability of the insurer
remains contingent and may never materialize for indemnity payment").
141. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 669 F. Supp. 307, 310 (C.D. Cal. 1987). For a case fram-
ing the same point in terms of justiciability, see Prashker v. United States Guarantee Co., 136
N.E.2d 871, 874-75 (N.Y. 1956) ("The courts do not make mere hypothetical adjudications,
where there is no presently justiciable controversy before the court .... ").
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whether adjudication of coverage would be sensible or efficient as to
the duty to defend. Second, even though ultimately the tort suit
might result in a finding of no liability, leaving the coverage issue un-
resolved has other undesirable effects relating to efficiency in the ad-
judicative process. These effects are explored in the next section. 142
At a minimum, these other effects should be considered before one
reaches a conclusion about the efficiency of the declaratory judgment
option.
A second possible version of the inefficiency argument is that al-
lowing the declaratory judgment in an overlapping fact case will often
result in two full-blown adjudications of the same or very similar is-
sues. Sometimes this duplication will not occur. The coverage and
liability issues might be factually linked but largely dissimilar. Or,
even if the issues are the same, the declaratory judgment action might
be completed before the same issue is aired in the tort suit; the find-
ing in the declaratory judgment action thus could be given collateral
estoppel effect in the tort suit (if the tort plaintiff were made a party
to the declaratory judgment action).14 Nonetheless, in at least some
cases, both the declaratory judgment action and the tort action will
engage in factfinding relating to the same or a closely similar issue.
For instance, both might adjudicate whether the defendant intention-
ally caused the harm."'
On inspection, however, the criticism relating to duplication
misses the mark. Disallowing the declaratory judgment action often
will not avoid the need for seemingly duplicative factfinding. The
intent-negligence scenario illustrates this point. Suppose that the de-
claratory judgment action is dismissed or stayed, that the tort suit ad-
judicates the issue of whether the insured caused the harm
intentionally, and that the defendant is found liable for negligently
caused harm. In many jurisdictions, if the insurer has provided a de-
fense, it has to pay for independent counsel because the overlap be-
tween the liability and coverage issues creates a conflict of interest
over the conduct of the defense in the underlying suit.145 So, even if
142. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing undesirable effects such as structural collusion, in-
surance funds being paid for uninsurable harms, collateral disputes, and an increase in the
number of tort suits that are tried rather than settled).
143. See supra note 114.
144. See, e.g., Harris, 445 F. Supp. at 850 (explaining that both actions would adjudicate
whether the defendant intentionally caused the harm).
145. 1 WINDT, supra note 72, § 4.20, at 218-19 (stating that if there is a conflict of interest
with respect to the manner in which the lawsuit should be defended, "the insurer should
consider either hiring 'independent counsel' to represent the insured or allowing the in-
sured to select private counsel"); Barker, When Does the Insurer Lose, supra note 8, at 470
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the jury renders a finding on the overlapping issue-in this case, that
the defendant did not act intentionally-that finding will not be given
collateral estoppel effect with respect to the coverage question be-
tween insurer and insured. Rather, the issue will have to be litigated
again in a coverage suit.146 Thus, disallowing the declaratory judg-
ment does not necessarily eliminate the prospect of two adjudications
relating to the same factual issue.
3. Interference With the Underlying Tort Proceeding.-Another possi-
ble problem with the declaratory judgment option is interference with
the underlying tort proceeding. Courts often cite this as a concern.
1 47
To an extent, this concern might be another way of stating the same
problems as those just discussed-potential harm to the insured, or
inefficient duplication of factfinding. When voiced by federal courts,
the interference concern often relates to deciding issues of state insur-
ance law.148 In addition to these issues, the concern over interference
might indicate an independent interest in allowing the tort proceed-
ing to adjudicate the issues relevant to that proceeding, apart from
any possible harm to the insured. Perhaps a part of this concern is the
notion that the tort plaintiff is entitled to resolution in the tort forum
of all the issues relevant to the tort case.
149
("The insurer's role is limited to payment of counsel who represents and is directed by the
insured alone.").
146. For a discussion of these points, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d
979, 983-84 (10th Cir. 1994).
147. See, e.g., Irvine v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579, 580 n.1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (criticizing the declaratory judgment option as allowing "the trial of
the entire [tort] case" to be "moved into the declaratory judgment action, but with the
insureds having to pay their own attorney's fees"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finney, 770
P.2d 460, 464 (Kan. 1989) (noting that cases have disallowed the declaratory judgment
when it would predetermine "at least one very cogent issue of the tort action[ ], since this
is not the purpose" of declaratory relief).
148. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 707 (D.
Haw. 1987) (stating that "the injured party should be allowed to control her own case" and
that the declaratory judgment action would prevent the victim "from controlling the pro-
gress of her case" and deprive her "of her right to trial byjury"); Brohawn v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975) (stating that permitting the declara-
tory judgment action would allow the defendant's insurer, not the plaintiffs in the tort
action, to control the litigation); Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Wyo.
1989) (noting that a declaratory judgment proceeding would "improperly allow the in-
surer to wrest control of the litigation from the injured party"). But see Metropolitan Prop-
erty & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kirkwood, 729 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that, "[a]lthough
[the plaintiffs in the tort suit] would prefer a tort trial, they have not explained how the
declaratory judgment proceeding could otherwise work to their disadvantage").
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4. The Undesirable Effects of Leaving the Coverage Issue Unresolved.-
Thus far, the declaratory judgment option seems undesirable in light
of the goals of efficient loss-spreading and fairness between insurer
and insured. But sticking to the complaint allegation rule as to over-
lapping facts also presents problems that must be considered. The
complaint allegation approach for overlapping facts leaves the cover-
age issue unresolved throughout the pendency of the tort suit. This
lack of resolution could have several unappealing effects: (1) enhanc-
ing the likelihood of structural collusion 150 between the tort plaintiff
and the tort defendant;15' (2) increasing the occasions when insur-
ance funds are paid for harms that should be uninsurable;15 2 (3) ad-
ding to the number of collateral disputes between insurer and insured
or between insured and insurance defense counsel; 53 and (4) possi-
bly, increasing the number of tort suits that are tried rather than
settled.
Turning to the first, structural collusion refers to occasions when
the presence of insurance diminishes or eliminates what otherwise
would be the plaintiffs and defendant's opposition to each other on
an issue or strategy in the tort suit. 154 A classic example is the plain-
tiff's choice to "underlitigate" an intentional tort as merely negligent,
in order to evade the intentional harm exclusion in standard insur-
ance policies.' 55 Other examples include sweetheart agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants that result after the insurer arguably
has breached a duty to the insured. 1 6 Structural collusion can dimin-
ish the accuracy and integrity of the adjudicative process. In addition,
it can result in insurance payments for harms that, for reasons of both
efficiency and justice, should not be insurable.' 57 The opportunities
150. Cf John Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
County Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 248 (1983) (applying the term "structural
collusion" to collusion that results from the incentives generated by attorneys' fees in class
actions).
151. See infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
153. See infta notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
154. See Coffee, supra note 150, at 248.
155. See Pryor, supra note 23, at 1721-23 (citing cases in which plaintiffs underlitigated in
an attempt to avoid the intentional harm exclusion).
156. See Wood, supra note 113, at 1385-89 (discussing the potential problems created by
sweetheart agreements). In my view, consent judgments following insurer breaches should
often be allowed. This route can be abused, because the opportunity for such arrange-
ments can give the parties an incentive to game the rules and to try to access insurance in
doubtful coverage or ufnderinsurance cases. These opportunities disappear, however, once
the coverage issue is resolved.
157. Cf Pryor, supra note 23, at 1740-45 (explaining that intentional harms are excluded
so as to avoid moral hazard and inefficiency).
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for this type of structural collusion diminish greatly once the coverage
issue itself is resolved.
158
Leaving the coverage issue unresolved also will increase the
number of collateral disputes that can arise between insurer and in-
sured (and between insured and defense counsel) over the handling
of the tort suit itself. Depending on the jurisdiction, these collateral
disputes can take the form of later tort litigation over the quality of
the defense that the insurer provided, 159 the insurer's failure to settle
the claim reasonably,' 60 or professional malpractice by defense coun-
sel. The point here is not to criticize the substantive law that allows
such claims; much of this remedial scheme is justified. Rather, the
point is that, without a lingering coverage issue, many of these dis-
putes would not arise in the first instance.
The final possible effect noted above-increasing the number of
suits that are litigated rather than settled-is a plausible theoretical
conclusion for at least some cases involving unresolved coverage dis-
putes. 161 In many tort cases, the defendant's uninsured assets will not
be sufficient to satisfy all or at least a major part of the expected judg-
ment. In such cases, how the coverage issue will be resolved is a ques-
tion that is crucial to the parties' estimates of the expected value of
158. Id. at 1756-58 (noting that, where the insurer is permitted to seek a declaratory
judgment on the issue of coverage, "a resolution of the declaratory judgment proceeding
will close many of the routes to insurance funding").
159. See JERRY, supra note 17, § I lI[g] (discussing insurer's liability for inadequate
defense).
160. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
161. The possible effect is one of the conclusions that could be drawn from an applica-
tion of the economic model of trial and settlement. The model theorizes that litigants'
choices are driven by their rational economic estimates of the likely judgment and the
costs of proceeding to trial. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
andJudicial Administration, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973); Priest & Klein, supra note
70, at 12-17. The economic model is perhaps the most dominant account of settlement
and trial behavior by parties. An alternative model makes heavy use of bargaining theory
to explain why certain disputes proceed to trial rather than settle. Under this approach,
trials frequently can be explained as the result of bargaining or negotiating gambits-such
as unreasonably hard bargaining-that fail. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). In
addition, a considerable literature suggests refinements and additions to the economic
theory. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A
New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REv. 77 (1997) (arguing that the role of lawyers
should be considered when analyzing how well the economic model explains the patterns
of trial and settlement); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70
S. CAL. L. REv. 113 (1996) (arguing that the economic model should be modified to take
account of theories of cognitive psychology). A large literature also examines the empiri-
cal support for the economic model. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to




the tort case. 162 The coverage question, moreover, is a separate varia-
ble from the variables of liability and damages. As a result, even when
the parties to the tort suit are not far apart in their evaluations of
liability and damage, they could diverge significantly on their esti-
mates of success on coverage. Thus, in some cases, the parties' valua-
tions of liability and damages might be sufficiently similar to allow a
settlement, 63 but divergence over the coverage question might scuttle
the chances of settlement.16
4
162. The expected value of the tort case is the aggregate of a series of potential out-
comes-for instance, that there is a 5% chance of a verdict in the range of $500,000, a 25%
chance of a verdict in the range of $200,000, a 10% chance of a no-liability finding, etc. See
Priest & Klein, supra note 70, at 6-12. When the likely judgments can be collected only
against insurance, and when insurance coverage is questionable, then the expected value
of the suit will be discounted by the uncertainty over coverage.
163. Under the economic model, a party will settle when the settlement exceeds the
expected value of continuing with the litigation. For instance, suppose that the plaintiffs
damages are $200,000, that the plaintiffs chances of prevailing on liability are 15%, and
that the costs of taking the case to trial are $10,000 for the plaintiff and $15,000 for the
defendant. From the plaintiff's perspective, the expected value of the case is $200,000 x
.15, less the costs that the plaintiff will have to incur to take the case to trial; that is,
$20,000. From the defendant's perspective, the expected payout in the case is $200,000 x
.15, plus the costs of taking the case to trial; that is, $45,000. The plaintiff will accept any
offer than exceeds $20,000, and the defendant will be willing to settle for any amount less
than $45,000.
Under the economic model, this case should settle unless (1) the parties' estimates of
the expected value of the case diverge enough to close the window for settlement-for
instance, the plaintiff in the above example calculates the chances of a favorable verdict as
60%, but the defendant calculates the chances as only 40%; (2) the parties have different
nonmonetary stakes in the outcome-for instance, one party is particularly concerned
about the precedential or reputational effect of a judgment. According to the influential
work of George Priest and Benjamin Klein, divergent estimates of the expected outcome
are more likely to block settlement in close cases; that is, when the case lies close to the
"decision standard." Priest & Klein, supra note 70, at 17-22. For further analysis and test-
ing of their hypothesis, see Gross & Syverud, supra note 161; Daniel Kessler et al., Explain-
ing Deviations From the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis
Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1995).
164. In one of the rare judicial discussions of how a lingering coverage question impacts
the parties' incentives to settle the underlying case, a California federal district court
agreed that addressing the coverage issue would increase the chances of settlement. But
the court argued that this effect was undesirable.
The prospect that the only source of payment for a significant verdict will not be
available after trial tends to coerce the tort claimant to come to the settlement
bargaining table before the federal [declaratory judgment] action is adjudicated.
There the tort claimant often will be met not only by the insurer, but also the
insured. Faced with the immediate prospect of having to provide its own defense,
and often with financial catastrophe if it is ultimately forced to respond to a major
verdict without contribution from its insurer, the insured suddenly may be willing
to make a major contribution to a settlement. Therefore, the result of the pres-
sures created by the federal [declaratory judgment] action often may be to create
a substantial possibility that the insurer will be able to force a settlement of the
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5. Other Considerations Under Declaratory Judgment Statutes.-Fed-
eral and state courts, when considering whether to allow the declara-
tory judgment action to adjudicate extrinsic evidence, have looked to
some considerations in addition to those already discussed. For fed-
eral courts, the primary such consideration is interference with the
state litigation.16 5 To some extent, this consideration implicates many
of the same factors already discussed, including the impact of the de-
claratory judgment option on the insured's defense, the possible dis-
advantages of leaving the coverage issue unresolved, and so forth. Yet
this consideration is independently significant because it signals a
preference against interference when the justification for or benefits
of that interference are weak or unclear. 1 66 And, as we have seen, the
declaratory judgment option is very troublesome for several reasons.
Thus, if the declaratory judgment option is properly viewed as inter-
fering with state court litigation, then the federal preference against
interference strengthens-even if it does not entirely resolve-the
case against the declaratory judgment option.
state court action in which it is required to contribute only a fraction of the value
of its potential economic exposures.
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 669 F. Supp. 307, 310-11 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (footnote omitted).
This is essentially an argument that we should prefer a regime under which carriers have to
pay the value of the tort claim undiscounted by doubts about coverage. See also North E.
Ins. Co. v. Northern Brokerage Co., 780 F. Supp. 318, 322 (D. Md. 1991) (arguing that
while insurance coverage might be relevant to settlement of the tort claim, "it is no more
relevant to settlement than are the underlying issues of liability and damages" so that
"there is no reason why resolution of the coverage issue should be given priority").
This view seems misguided. Sometimes coverage is not available because the underly-
ing conduct cannot or should not be insured at an actuarially fair price. Thus, a regime
that does not take coverage doubts into account would override coverage limitations that
are efficient and fair. In addition, even when coverage limitations are the result of mis-
taken purchasing decisions by insureds, it is better to address this problem directly than to
prefer a regime that generally postpones consideration of coverage doubts.
165. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283 (1995) (reasoning that, "at least
where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of
the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court might be indulging in
'[g]ratituous interference,' if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed" (cita-
tion omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491,
495 (1942)); Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 697 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
"relatively discrete nature of the inquiry necessary in order to resolve [the duty to defend
issue] poses no demonstrable need to engage in any extensive discovery or factfinding that
might interfere with the.., action in state court"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31
F.3d 979, 984 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that "entertaining State Farm's summary judgment
motion involved no undue interference with the state proceeding").
166. See, e.g., Zavalis, 52 F.3d at 694 (stating that the federal court presiding over the
declaratory judgment action on the duty to defend should not decide whether the insured
acted intentionally or negligently, because this is a factual dispute "that should be left to
the court presiding over the underlying tort action").
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The declaratory judgment option does implicate the issue of in-
terference. If the insurer, in the declaratory judgment proceeding,
joins the state tort plaintiff as defendant, then the declaratory judg-
ment might have collateral estoppel effect on an issue in the state tort
suit.
1 6 7
Notice, however, that many overlapping fact contexts will not
present this problem. First, the insurer might not join the tort plain-
tiff. Second, even if the tort plaintiff is joined, the factual or legal
issues to be decided in the declaratory judgment action might be dis-
tinct from those to be decided in the tort suit, even if some facts are
relevant to both. An example is whether an insured's polluting activi-
ties were sudden and accidental. The tort suit will not adjudicate the
issues of suddenness or the policy's definition of "accident." Rather,
the tort suit will adjudicate only the issues of negligence, gross negli-
gence, and so forth. Certain facts will be relevant both to the issues in
the declaratory judgment action and to the issues in the tort action.
But a declaratory judgment would not resolve the same issues. None-
theless, the interference concern adds some weight to the case against
the declaratory judgment option.
Another possible concern is that adjudication of the coverage is-
sue is premature. The argument begins with the point that allowing
the adjudication of the duty to defend by means of extrinsic evidence
would be tantamount to adjudicating ,the coverage question.
Although this point is correct, it does not follow that adjudication of
coverage is premature until resolution of the underlying lawsuit. This
contention is based on the following reasoning: there is no liability
unless and until the tort suit produces a judgment or settlement for
the plaintiff, the issue of coverage is entirely irrelevant unless and un-
til the tort suit produces a judgment or settlement for the plaintiff,
and thus the issue of coverage is irrelevant until the outcome of the
tort suit.168 This reasoning fails to take into account the insurer's de-
fense obligation, which is triggered at the outset of the suit. If insur-
ers were allowed to adjudicate a coverage contention before the
completion of the tort suit, the insurer could be relieved of further
defense costs. Thus, it is incorrect to say that the coverage issue impli-
cates no actual controversy until the completion of the tort suit.169
167. See supra note 114.
168. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 290, 296 (D. Ariz. 1983).
169. A number of courts have rejected this prematurity argument. See, e.g., Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Ridenour, 629 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (noting
that requiring the insurer to provide a defense when it has no obligation to do so may pose
an irreparable injury).
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This is not meant as an argument that the insurer should be al-
lowed to adjudicate the coverage issue before the completion of the
tort suit. Indeed, as explained earlier, allowing this is very trouble-
some."v Rather, the point is that the declaratory judgment option
should not be disallowed solely on the flawed premise that the cover-
age issue is irrelevant until the outcome of the tort suit. It could be
relevant to the defense obligation, if we chose to allow that obligation
to be defeated by extrinsic facts.
6. Devising a Declaratory Judgment Approach to Overlapping Extrinsic
Facts.-Each of the possible approaches to overlapping extrinsic evi-
dence has significant problems. Allowing use of overlapping extrinsic
evidence would sometimes be inconsistent with the level of litigation
insurance that, ex ante, insureds would prefer. 71 But the alterna-
tive-disallowing the adjudication of the duty to defend by means of
extrinsic evidence in a declaratory judgment action-allows coverage
disputes to linger throughout the tort litigation. This may have all the
undesirable effects just outlined. We lack empirical information
about many of the points that would help us evaluate the weight of
these concerns. We do not know, for instance, how often allowing the
declaratory judgment action to proceed would undermine the in-
sured's tort defense; how often an unresolved coverage dispute would
cause the tort case to be tried rather than settled; or how significantly
the resolution of the coverage dispute would reduce the amount of
structural collusion or collateral disputes.
In light of these uncertainties, the most defensible and workable
approach is to apply a general presumption against allowing the de-
claratory judgment action to adjudicate the duty to defend-and
hence the coverage issue-on the basis of overlapping extrinsic facts.
The term "overlapping extrinsic facts" refers to any facts extrinsic to
the complaint that are relevant both to (1) coverage and (2) liability
or damages in the tort suit. This presumption could be overcome by
the insurer's showing that allowing the action to proceed would not
potentially weaken the insured's defense on liability or damages. This
would be the case if the insurer's efforts to develop facts or arguments
relating to coverage could not undermine the strength of the in-
sured's defense on liability or damages in the tort suit.
17 2
170. See supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text.
172. When federal courts entertain declaratory judgment actions simultaneously with
state tort suits, a relevant concern is interference with the state court process. See supra
notes 165-167 and accompanying text. One might cite this concern and argue that, in
these contexts, the insurer should never be allowed to seek adjudication of overlapping
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
This approach is similar to that endorsed by some commentators
and courts in recent years. 17 3 For instance, Colorado courts will not
allow the declaratory judgment action to proceed unless it "con-
cern [s] issues that are independent of and separable from those in
the underlying case." 174 Kansas courts do not allow the declaratory
judgment if it would adjudicate a key issue in the underlying suit.175
It is important to appreciate that the proposed approach does
not relate to occasions when the insurer seeks a declaratory judgment
based only on the complaint allegation approach. The declaratory
judgment action concerning the duty to defend should be allowed to
proceed even in overlapping fact cases if the insurer seeks only a rul-
ing that, on the basis of the complaint allegation rule, it owes no duty
to defend. 176
III. COVERAGE-ONLY SITUATIONS
How should the defense obligation be structured with respect to
factual or legal allegations that relate only to coverage and not to the
underlying suit? Courts have followed a number of approaches. Prob-
ably a majority continue to apply the eight-comers rule at the outset,
extrinsic facts. Yet the approach advocated in the text should adequately address concerns
about federal interference with the state process. The court will adjudicate an overlapping
extrinsic fact only in the relatively rare case when it does not potentially undermine the
insured's defense in the tort suit.
173. See Howard, supra note 118, at 37 (arguing that "[w] hen no such danger [of preju-
dicing the insured or claimant] is realistically posed, the [declaratory judgment action]
may proceed before the parallel action is tried").
174. Constitution Assoc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 562 (Colo. 1996); see
also Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Ridenour, 629 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per
curiam) (allowing the declaratoryjudgment action when it "requires the resolution of facts
largely extraneous to those alleged in and necessary to the plaintiff's case"); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelton, 531 N.E.2d 913, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that, under
Illinois law, the declaratory judgment court "must not determine disputed factual issues
that are crucial to the insured's liability in the underlying personal injury lawsuit"); Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co. v. Artra Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 594, 659 A.2d 1295, 1311 (1995)(allowing the declaratory judgment because there are "no issues to be determined at trial
which are intertwined with" the coverage issue).
175. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finney, 770 P.2d 460, 466 (Kan. 1989) (recogniz-
ing two specific instances of potential prejudice in "requiring the insured to litigate the key
issues in the underlying suit in a declaratory judgment action against his own insurance
company"). Notice that this approach might allow the declaratory judgment to proceed in
more cases than the approach endorsed in text.
176. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining
why the court could adjudicate the duty to defend in an intentional harm case without
looking beyond the allegations in the complaint); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31
F.3d 979; 984-85 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining why, even in a shooting case involving allega-
tions of intentional conduct, the duty to defend could be decided in the declaratory judg-
ment proceeding on the basis of the complaint allegation rule).
[VOL. 58:1
THE TORT LIABILrrY REGIME
but then allow the insurer to adjudicate the coverage issue by means
of extrinsic evidence in a declaratory judgment action before the com-
pletion of the tort suit.17 7 Some courts follow limited versions of an
actual facts approach. For instance, some allow the insurer to rely on
actual facts with respect to limited types of coverage issues, such as
whether the defendant has insured status or the vehicle was insured
under the policy. 178 Another limited approach allows the insurer to
rely on the actual facts if the coverage-relevant allegation is contra-
dicted by known or readily ascertainable facts,
1 79 is obviously false, 180
or is clearly motivated only by a desire to access insurance.
181
To determine the optimal structure of the defense obligation
with respect to coverage-only situations, we should again look at what
rational insureds would wish to purchase by way of defense insurance.
Specifically, would the insured wish to purchase a defense insurance
policy governed entirely by the eight-corners rule, even as to coverage-
only allegations?
Consider a prospective insured who is offered two types of indem-
nity coverage. Policy A has indemnity coverage for injuries arising
from the business use of the boat, but the coverage costs more. Policy
B has indemnity coverage for injuries arising only from the personal
use of the boat, not from business use. The insured, let us suppose,
chooses B, either because he does not anticipate using the boat in
connection with business, or because he knows that he will be indem-
nified by some other source for any liabilities connected to business
uses.
177. See 2 WINDT, supra note 72, § 8.03, at 4 (stating this approach and citing cases that
follow it).
178. See Shelton, 531 N.E.2d at 919 (stating that an actual facts approach can be used only
if the coverage issue relates to "such ancillary matters as whether the insured paid the
premiums or whether he is the proper insured under the policy").
179. See Rowell v. Hodges, 434 F.2d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (rejecting
the notion that the duty to defend is governed by the complaint allegation rule when "the
uncontrovertible and indisputable facts, ascertained by the insurance company long before
the action is commenced and confirmed by its own insured, demonstrate that there never
was any insurance coverage for the casualty alleged in the first place"); American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 678 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (interpreting Wisconsin law
to allow an exception to the complaint allegation rule when the facts known by or readily
ascertainable by the insurer conflict with the pleadings), affd, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir.
1983).
180. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metzler, 586 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (not-
ing that, under Indiana law, it is "well settled that where an insurer's independent investi-
gation of the facts underlying a complaint against its insured reveals a claim patently
outside of the risks covered by the policy, the insurer may properly refuse to defend").
181. See State Farm Ins. Co. v. Trezza, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating
that, where a "complaint has been drafted in bad faith and designed solely to bring an
insurer into a case," a court would be warranted in allowing examination of the facts).
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What kind of defense insurance will the insured purchase? One
option would be defense insurance governed entirely by the com-
plaint allegation rule, even for coverage-only allegations, as distinct
from liability-relevant allegations. Under this option, the insured
would be furnished a defense whenever the complaint alleges that the
boat was being used only in connection with personal and not busi-
ness uses. A second option would provide a defense only if, according
to the actual facts, the boat was being used in connection with personal
and not business reasons. The second option would cost less than the
first.
Keeping in mind that this insured has chosen indemnity coverage
that does not extend to business uses of the boat, the second option
would be the more desirable one. It is cheaper. It contains the core
protection that this insured wants: the insurer must defend against all
accidents arising out of nonbusiness uses of the boat, and the insurer
cannot escape a defense just because the lawsuit lacks substantive or
legal merit. Only in one circumstance will the first option provide
defense insurance when the second will not: The insured was in fact
using the boat in connection with business pursuits, but the complaint
alleges that the insured was using the boat in connection with per-
sonal uses only. Is this additional insurance worth the cost? Remem-
ber, we have assumed that this insured, for various reasons, opted
against indemnity insurance for business-related accidents. For these
same reasons, the insured would not be willing to pay a higher price
for litigation insurance that essentially provides this same indemnity
coverage.
Thus, with respect to coverage-only allegations, in theory the in-
sured would prefer defense insurance not governed solely by the com-
plaint allegation approach. We still must choose a doctrinal
alternative. Two choices are possible:"8 2 (1) the actual facts and not
182. Another choice is to use some type of limited exception to the eight-corners rule,
as some courts seem to do. See, e.g., American Motorists, 544 F. Supp. at 678 (noting that,
under Wisconsin law, when a conflict exists between the alleged facts and those that the
insurer knows or can readily ascertain, "the court may consider facts known at the appro-
priate time by the insurer when determining whether the insurer has breached its duty to
defend"). Yet these limited exceptions have complexities that are notjustified by the bene-
fits of the rule. For instance, the "known or readily ascertainable" approach requires an
assessment of which facts the insurer knew or could readily ascertain at the time the de-
fense was tendered to the insurer. This is far more complicated an inquiry than the yes-no
question of coverage. Likewise, exceptions that are triggered only by "patently false" alle-
gations or by a plaintiffs motivation to access insurance require an inquiry, respectively,
into the extent of the truth or falsity of the allegations, and the plaintiff's subjective state of
mind. None of these complexities seems worth any possible benefits of these limited ex-
ceptions. In all likelihood, these limitations stem from a fear that broadening the bounda-
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the alleged facts govern from the very outset; or (2) the complaint
allegation rule governs at the outset, but the insurer may adjudicate,
by means of extrinsic evidence, the duty to defend in a declaratory
judgment proceeding. 83 Under the first approach, the insurer would
be free to deny the duty to defend on the basis of the actual facts; the
denial would breach the duty to defend only if the insurer turned out
to be wrong on the coverage question. For instance, suppose the in-
surer denied a defense based on its contention that the boat was being
operated in connection with business and not personal purposes. If
the insurer prevailed on the business use contention in the eventual
suit between insurer and insured on coverage, its denial of a defense
would not constitute a breach of the duty to defend. Conversely, if
the insurer lost on the coverage contention, its denial of a defense
would be a breach of the duty to defend.
Both versions have some disadvantages. The first-that actual
facts govern from the outset-is acceptable in theory, since it matches
the level of defense insurance that is optimal in theory.18 4 Under this
approach, the defense obligation will extend even to cases that are
doubtful on their merits; insurers will generally not be allowed to con-
test the defense obligation on the basis of overlapping extrinsic facts;
and, with respect to coverage-only facts, the insurer will be obligated
to provide a defense when there is indemnity coverage. Yet the ap-
proach raises some practical concerns. It depends on a distinction
between coverage-only and overlapping facts. The distinction is gen-
erally workable and understandable, and declaratory judgment courts
in many jurisdictions have been employing it for some time.185 Still,
abandoning the eight-corners rule for coverage-only allegations would
elevate the practical import of the distinction. No longer would the
distinction be simply one factor that courts use in deciding how to
exercise their discretion with respect to declaratory judgment actions.
Rather, the distinction would form part of the liability rule: the in-
ries of the complaint allegation rule will not provide sufficient protection to the insured.
As explained in the text, however, the suggested approach confers adequate protection on
the insured.
183. This is the approach taken by most courts. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-65 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (examining multiple California
appellate cases, and holding that an insurer, in a declaratory judgment action, may look to
extrinsic evidence to determine its duty to defend the insured).
184. See supra text accompanying note 182.
185. See, e.g., Constitution Assoc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 562 (Colo.
1996) (requiring that a declaratory judgment action concern "issues that are independent
of and separable from those in the underlying case"); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Ridenour, 629
So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (distinguishing between facts
concerning the issue of coverage and facts in the tort plaintiff's complaint).
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surer would breach the duty to defend if it incorrectly viewed a set of
facts as relating only to coverage. The distinction might not always be
clear. Even so, however, if the insurer were sued in such a case for
failure to defend, whether the basis of the denial related only to cover-
age or overlapped with the underlying suit could and should be deter-
mined as a matter of law.
The second approach-that the complaint allegation rule gov-
erns at the outset-would avoid the adjudicative costs of carving out a
coverage-only exception to the eight-corners rule. But, under the sec-
ond approach, the insurer would be required to defend up until the
time it obtained an adjudication of no coverage. This defense obliga-
tion raises the concerns discussed earlier: the opportunity for struc-
tural collusion between the tort plaintiff and insured defendant, and
disputes about the manner in which the insurer or defense counsel
conducted the defense.18 6
On balance, the actual facts approach seems preferable." 7 It de-
livers the appropriate level of defense insurance in theory, and the
usual breach of contract and extracontractual remedies would be
available for mistakes or abuses in the application of the approach.18 8
Indeed, as just noted, it appears that many courts have been applying
something akin to this approach by allowing the actual facts to govern,
from the outset, with respect to questions such as the identity of the
insured or the insured vehicle. 8
To make clear how the approach would work, consider again a
case involving the business purposes exclusion. Suppose the insurer
receives notice of a suit alleging that the boat was being driven in
connection with personal uses at the time of the accident. Or perhaps
the suit does not make any particular allegation as to business versus
personal use, and the issue is ambiguous. The insurer, however, has
some preliminary facts suggesting that the accident occurred during a
business use of the boat. The insurer is not certain of this, and has
not yet conducted a thorough investigation of the point.
186. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
187. Some analysts have endorsed this approach. See Ashley, supra note 8, at 201 (con-
cluding that "[i]f the insurer has doubts about coverage based on coverage-determining
facts, it should have the right to refuse to defend"); Barker, Dissident Thoughts, supra note 8,
at 118 (arguing against "imposing a duty to defend based on doubts as to coverage-
determining facts extrinsic to the underlying litigation").
188. See supra notes 108-110 (providing examples of extracontractual protections in the
form of statutes, regulations, and common law bad faith protections).
189. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts distin-
guished between coverage-only and overlapping facts).
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Suppose the insurer denies a defense on the basis of the business
uses exclusion. This will not be a breach of the duty to defend if (1)
the contested legal and factual issues relating to the coverage issue
cannot affect the strength or weakness of the insured's defense in the
underlying tort suit; and (2) the insurer prevails in a factual adjudica-
tion of the business versus personal use issue. Whether the first condi-
tion is satisfied is a question of law; whether the second condition is
satisfied depends on how the coverage issue is adjudicated.
The first condition will not always be an easy call. But this diffi-
culty does not render the suggested approach unworkable. Instead, it
creates an incentive for insurers to employ an actual facts approach
only when it is quite clear that the coverage-relevant allegation has no
bearing on the strength or weakness of the plaintiffs tort suit. When
there is an overlap, or when the insurer is unsure whether an overlap
exists, the insurer should apply the eight-corners rule rather than the
actual facts approach. The insurer then can seek to litigate the cover-
age issue by means of extrinsic facts in the declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding. The question of overlap then becomes the court's call.
CONCLUSION
The mechanism of defense insurance allocates and spreads a sig-
nificant slice of the transaction costs generated by the tort liability sys-
tem. Thus, its scope and structure implicate concerns of fairness and
efficiency for both potential and actual defendants. In addition, de-
fense insurance also shapes the conduct and strategies of tort plain-
tiffs, insured defendants, insurers handling tort defenses, and insurers
denying tort defenses and undertaking coverage litigation. It gener-
ates a large quantity of collateral litigation over the insurer's bad faith
in not defending, the insurer's mishandling of the defense, and the
misconduct of defense counsel retained by the insurer. And, because
defense insurance can influence whether payment to the tort victim
occurs, this form of insurance affects the fairness and efficiency objec-
tives of the tort liability system.
A close look at the theory and structure of defense insurance il-
luminates these consequences of defense insurance. In addition, it
explains and justifies many of the current features of defense insur-
ance, including its frequent-though not universal-bundling with
indemnity insurance and its close-although not identical-similarity
to the scope of indemnity insurance.
The biggest puzzle of defense insurance is its decisional structure,
which differs from that of all other forms of first-party insurance. The
insurance policy language, contrary to the assumptions of many
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courts, is indeterminate with respect to the appropriate decisional
structure when a coverage issue exists. The standard interpretive tools
applied to insurance language also do not persuasively support the
decisional approach that most courts follow. In addition, some rea-
sons that have traditionally been advanced for the current approach
do not withstand inspection.
Nonetheless, defense insurance in some cases does require a dif-
ferent decisional structure. These are the cases in which the coverage-
relevant facts on which the insurer would rely are also at issue in the
underlying tort suit. In these cases, an insured who pursued the car-
rier for denial of a defense would be in the position of gaining an
additional adversary on an issue that could undermine the insured's
defense in the tort suit. This is a concern distinct from that which
inheres in all insurance contexts-a dispute between insurer and in-
sured-and which we address with potent extracontractual remedies.
Instead, in the overlapping context, the insured might suffer a harm
that cannot be undone with the traditional remedies. For this reason,
the Article has argued that the complaint allegation approach is ap-
propriate in such cases, and that generally courts should decline to
consider a declaratory judgment action that seeks to adjudicate the
coverage issue while the tort suit is pending.
In other cases, however, the insurer's reason for doubting cover-
age is not connected to the issues at stake in the tort suit. In these
nonoverlapping contexts, this Article has demonstrated that insureds
ex ante would desire defense insurance governed by the actual, not
the alleged, facts relating to coverage. Thus, the only reasons to re-
tain the complaint allegation rule in such contexts are concerns about
wrongful denials and the adjudicative costs of distinguishing between
overlapping contexts and nonoverlapping contexts. Yet these con-
cerns are not sufficient to sustain the use of the complaint allegation
rule in nonoverlapping cases. Indeed, many courts already have de-
parted from a complaint allegation rule to at least some extent in such
contexts.
Despite this trend, the contours of defense insurance are unset-
tled or unstable in a number ofjurisdictions, and the theory and ratio-
nales for the various current approaches remain quite divergent.
With a richer understanding of the theory and structure of defense
insurance, we will be better equipped to implement the defense obli-
gation in a way that is consistent with the efficiency and fairness objec-
tives of the tort liability regime.
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